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Chapter 1
Introduction and summary
The last couple of years have seen developments in nancial markets, especially
in the US, that challenge macroeconomic and monetary policy. While the era
of the Great Moderation has seen a considerable decline in output and ination
volatility, at the same time asset prices have experienced large swings. Among
them are the sharp rise and fall of U.S. stock prices around the turn of the
millennium and the surge and subsequent slowing of U.S. house prices. The
movement of European stock and house prices has been a matter of debate too
(ECB, 2005a, 2005b, 2006).
Asset prices play an important role in modern economies and are of interest to
policy makers for various reasons. Being inherently forward-looking asset prices
can provide information about the expectations of the market regarding future
productivity and ination. Moreover, they might impact on ination if high
asset prices spill over to goods prices ination. In addition, in the past, swings
in asset prices were typically accompanied by uctuations of credit expansion in
the same direction. Moreover, asset price booms were often followed by distress
in nancial markets or the real economy (Borio and Lowe, 2002).
A recurring theme in this context is whether central banks should respond
actively to changes in asset prices. It might be desirable to avoid boom-bust
cycles in asset prices and the possible consequences for the real economy by
adjusting interest rates in the face of rapid rises and falls in asset prices. There
are, however, a number of problems associated with an active response to asset
prices. Since it is very di¢ cult to identify deviations from fundamentals in asset
prices, it is unclear to what extent an asset price change is attributed to changes
in fundamental determinants. The distinction between fundamental and non-
fundamental movements, however, is crucial in designing the appropriate interest
rate response. Moreover, a pre-emptive strategy to counter an asset price boom
possibly at the expense of output might be hard to justify to the public. In
contrast, a strategy accommodating a surge in asset prices and mitigating any
real consequences from a fall might be easier to justify from an ex-ante point of
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view. However, this strategy has been criticised as inviting excessive risk-taking.
Within the context of increased attention to nancial stability a di¤erent
but related development in recent years has been the introduction of a new
regulatory framework for the banking industry, the New Basel Capital Accord
(Basel II). It e¤ectively applies to banks in Europe, the U.S. and the remaining
G10 countries and modies the existing Basel Capital Accord (Basel I) in a
number of dimensions. The central element is a minimum capital requirement
which banks must full at all times and which states that a bank has to hold
at least eight percent of its risk-weighted assets in the form of capital. The
requirement is aimed at increasing the stability of the banking system. The
New Basel Accord introduces variable risk-weights based on borrowersratings
to calculate risk-weighted assets. This had become necessary to avoid regulatory
arbitrage due to risk-weights being assigned according to borrower category
under Basel I. While the new rules certainly succeed in limiting the scope for
regulatory arbitrage and in guaranteeing a oor to individual bank capitalisation
there have been concerns about their macroeconomic implications, especially in
terms of aggregate bank lending. One criticism that has been voiced is that
capital requirements based on variable borrower ratings might unduly exacerbate
business cycles. In a downswing applied risk measures increase and force banks
to either take up more capital, which might be hard, or to reduce lending instead.
This might lead to a worsening of a recession.
A large amount of research is being done on these issues and they are still
largely unresolved. This thesis addresses three problems which are of funda-
mental relevance and have also featured in the recent developments in nancial
markets: The optimal response of monetary policy to house price movements,
the moral hazard problem associated with central bank intervention in a nan-
cial crisis, and the e¤ect of risk-based bank capital regulation on the cyclicality
of aggregate bank lending. The goal is to contribute to understanding and as-
sessing the e¤ects of monetary and regulatory policy on macroeconomic variables
like the output gap, ination, asset prices and aggregate credit by shedding new
light on these issues.
Undoubtedly these are areas of high policy relevance as the events in nancial
markets in 2007 and in the beginning of 2008 have demonstrated. The example
of the so-called subprime crisis serves well to illustrate how the three themes
of this thesis connect. Low interest rates and increasing house prices in the
U.S. in recent years were associated with an expansion in home mortgage lend-
ing. This had an impact on both the build-up of debt and the ability to turn
increased housing value into consumption. However, when interest rates rose
and house price growth slowed, indebted homeowners increasingly defaulted on
their mortgages, which in turn led to losses at banks. Moreover, non-defaulting
2
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home-owners were unable to sustain part of their consumption through home
values.
One question that has received a lot of attention when house price growth
started to slow is whether the Fed should adjust interest rates to a fall in house
prices (see Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2007; Financial Times, 2007a).
The concern was that house prices a¤ect output and ination, possibly with a
lag, such that lowering interest rates would mitigate the consequences for the real
economy. However, to ensure an appropriate policy response it is important to
evaluate the exact mechanism by which house prices a¤ect output and ination.
Chapter 2 therefore looks at how monetary policy should optimally respond
to movements in house prices. Housing is an important part of household wealth,
especially in the U.S. In contrast to stock wealth it can be used to borrow against.
Moreover housing equity withdrawal, a nancial instrument o¤ered by lenders
in the U.S., allows homeowners to convert an increase in their home value into
cash. If homeowners are liquidity constrained, which is true for a substantial
part of U.S. homeowners, they are likely to expand consumption. A theoretical
model is set up to capture the wealth e¤ect on consumption arising from liq-
uidity constrained homeowners borrowing against an increase in their housing
collateral, and an aggregate demand curve is derived. The innovation is to allow
for time-varying liquidity constraints. For a given state of the process of nan-
cial innovation, rising house prices alleviate liquidity constraints, and falling ones
tighten them. As a result the proportion of agents who respond to movements of
house prices, the output gap, expected ination and the interest rate changes as
house prices vary. An otherwise standard New Keynesian framework is used to
derive the optimal interest rate rule for monetary policy. The results show that
monetary policy should react to movements in house prices over and above their
impact on the output gap and ination because they a¤ect the optimal weights
on the output gap and expected ination in the interest rate rule. The reason is
that constrained agents dont consume according to a usual Euler equation but
consume their current liquid assets. Therefore they react in a di¤erent way to
monetary policy. Moreover, the proportion of constrained agents is determined
by house prices via relaxing and tightening liquidity constraints.
In addition to the consequences for aggregate demand from falling house
prices, widespread default on mortgages and subsequently on the securitised as-
sets based on them made banks reluctant to lend to each other resulting in a
liquidity shortage. This prompted the central banks in the U.S., Europe, the
U.K. and elsewhere to intervene, rst by injecting additional liquidity by open
market operation and, in the case of the Fed, subsequently lowering the target
for the Fed funds rate. This caused considerable debate among commentators
and analysts, who argued that the Fed and the ECB e¤ectively bailed-out -
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nancial market participants by injecting additional liquidity and lowering the
interest rate. Critics, mainly from academia and the media, argue that provid-
ing liquidity assistance and lowering interest rates after troubles in asset markets
generates moral hazard resulting in excessive risk-taking by investors, who be-
lieve the central bank will come to rescue them if things go wrong (see e.g.
Financial Times, 2001). This hypothesis is known as the so-called Greenspan
put because former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan lowered interest rates in re-
sponse to the stock market crash in October 1987, after the crisis relating to
the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in September 1998
and again in the wake of the U.S. stock market decline at the beginning of the
new millennium. In contrast, others mostly central bankers  deny that a
central bank intervention in response to problems in nancial markets leads to
moral hazard on the part of investors (see Cecchetti, 2007; Poole, 2007) because
e.g. the Fed only responds to output and ination, and not specically to asset
prices.
Chapter 3 investigates the empirical content of the so-called Greenspan put
hypothesis. Even though it has been debated among academics and in the media
for almost a decade, there are only very few theoretical works and no empirical
ones. Therefore we contribute to the debate by empirically testing whether
the actions of the Fed in October 1987 after the Black Monday stock market
crash and in September 1998 after the LTCM crisis had an impact on the stock
price boom in the late 1990s. Some have argued that investors believed in an
implicit guarantee by the Fed to intervene should stock prices plunge. This
would result in excessive risk-taking, which pushed up stock prices. The rst
part of the analysis establishes that there was a statistically signicant element
in the valuation of stock prices that cannot be explained by the present value
model for stock prices. The use of a state-space framework allows to get an
inferred time-series estimate of the unexplained part of stock prices, which is
commonly labelled as bubble. The second part uses variables derived from the
few existing theoretical models of the Greenspan put to derive proxy indicators
for moral hazard and test whether they had any signicant impact on U.S. stock
prices in the late 1990s. The tests are unable to conrm the hypothesis that
there existed a Greenspan put option.
Widespread default on mortgages not only resulted in a liquidity shortage
but also in considerable losses and write-downs at many banks. In light of
the introduction of the New Basel Accord in Europe and the U.S., Goodhart
(Financial Times, 2007b) points out that the losses on the part of banks might
interact with the new capital requirements in a way that might exacerbate any
negative consequences for the real economy. The reason is that if bankslosses
erode their capital base down to the required minimum they are constrained from
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expanding lending. In addition, if risk-weights of borrowers rise, as is likely in
a downswing, banks regulatory capital ratio falls further and they might be
forced to cut back lending exacerbating the negative consequences for the real
economy even more.
Chapter 4 looks at whether the introduction of risk-based bank capital regu-
lation à la Basel II exacerbates the cyclicality of aggregate bank lending. More
specically, the contribution is to discuss in a theoretical model the implica-
tions of time-varying risk-weights when taking into account that most banks
hold capital bu¤ers on top of the minimum capital requirement. Incorporating
this stylised fact into a model with heterogeneous banks, which di¤er in their
capital holdings, allows to work out di¤erent factors that a¤ect the cyclicality of
aggregate bank lending. Within the setup it is found that there is indeed scope
for increased cyclicality of bank lending under variable risk-weights. The degree
of excess cyclicality depends mainly on the sensitivity of the risk-weights with
respect to changes in aggregate risk and the ease with which additional funds can
be added or withdrawn from the aggregate banking balance sheet. Thus, while
the New Basel Accord corrects certain failures in the original rules, it is likely
to introduce another negative side-e¤ect in the form of increased uctuation in
aggregate bank lending.
The three chapters are self-contained and can be read independently of each
other.
References
Borio, C. and P. Lowe (2002): Asset prices, nancial and monetary stability:
exploring the nexus. Bank for International Settlements Working Paper No.
114.
Cecchetti, S. (2007): Does well-designed monetary policy encourage risk-taking?
VOX at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/99 [12 February 2008].
ECB (2005a): Asset price bubbles and monetary policy. Monthly Bulletin April
2005, 47-60.
ECB (2005b): Wealth and asset price e¤ects on economic activity. Occasional
paper series No. 29.
ECB (2006): Assessing house price developments in the Euro area. Monthly
Bulletin February 2006, 55-70.
5
Introduction and summary
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2007): Housing, housing nance and
monetary policy. A symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City, 30 August - 1 September, Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
Financial Times (2001): Lex - The Greenspan put. 4 January 2001.
Financial Times (2007a): Aggressive Fed action on house prices foreseen. 1
September 2007.
Financial Times (2007b): Capital, not liquidity, is the problem. 13 September
2007.
Poole, W. (2007): Market bailouts and the "Fed put". Speech at the Cato
Institute, Washington, D.C., 30 November 2007.
6
Chapter 2
The role of liquidity constraints
in the response of monetary
policy to house prices
2.1 Introduction
Empirically there is a strong wealth e¤ect on consumption spending. Conven-
tional wisdom is that the marginal propensity to consume out of total net wealth
is 3-5 cents per dollar (Altissimo et al., 2005). Furthermore, various studies nd
a stronger wealth e¤ect of housing than of stock wealth for the U.S. (e.g. Davis
and Palumbo, 2001; Case, Quigley and Shiller, 2001; Carroll, Otsuka and Sla-
calek, 2006). The di¤erence may be explained by the more even distribution of
housing wealth than of stock wealth across households, with a owner-occupier
rate of nearly 70% in the U.S. and housing representing a larger part of total
household wealth than equities (Illing and Klüh, 2005).
From a theoretical perspective it is not straightforward to justify the wealth
e¤ect from housing1. Consider a representative innitely lived agent who owns
the house in which she lives. An exogenous rise in house prices at a constant
interest rate just compensates for the higher present value of expected future
imputed rents. In this case the change in net wealth is zero and shouldnt have
an e¤ect on consumption. Even if the agent moved to a cheaper place, if housing
services in the future improved, if higher collateral value resulted in saving on
interest payments, or if the agent owned a high-value house but lived in a cheap
one, there neednt be a wealth e¤ect. Since the agent lives forever any change in
net wealth is spread out into the innite future and shouldnt a¤ect consumption
today. However, if the agent is liquidity constrained an increase in the value of
the house can serve as additional collateral to borrow against. Housing value
1Carroll (2004) provides a discussion of this issue.
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serves as a means to bring forward consumption and helps to smooth it over
time, even though net worth hasnt changed2. In this case an increase in house
prices can lead to an e¤ect on consumption. Some authors argue theoretically
and empirically that the process of nancial liberalisation since the mid 1980s
has increased the proportion of housing collateral that can be used to borrow
against (e.g. Attanasio and Weber, 1994; Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh, 2006;
Muellbauer et al., 1990; Ortalo-Magné and Rady, 2006). Others stress the role of
rising house prices for a given level of nancial liberalisation (e.g. Campbell and
Cocco, 2007; Carroll, 2004). In the long run the fraction of liquidity constrained
homeowners should decrease as nancial innovation and liberalisation proceed
and increase e.g. the loan-to-value ratio. In the short run the fraction of liquidity
constrained agents varies because the possibility to smooth consumption depends
on the level of house prices for given nancial instruments. A su¢ cient increase
in house prices is necessary for home-owners to benet from the possibility of
housing equity withdrawal. Housing equity withdrawal is the di¤erence between
net lending secured on housing and households gross investment in housing
(Bank of England). This way homeowners can increase their mortgage, i.e. cash
ow, by a fraction of the increase in the value of their house3. Therefore it is
clear that the fraction of liquidity constrained agents is not constant over time.
Housing equity withdrawal in the US and the UK has indeed increased con-
siderably in the early 2000s at the same time as house prices increased as doc-
umented in gures (2.1) and (2.2). The simple correlation coe¢ cient of the two
series for the US is 0.83, while the one for the UK is smaller at 0.35.
Furthermore, Hurst and Sta¤ord (2004) have shown that households do in-
deed use housing equity to smooth consumption in the face of an adverse shock
such as unemployment4. For an economically signicant e¤ect on consumption
a su¢ ciently large fraction of households must be homeowners and liquidity
constrained. Figures (2.3) and (2.4) show the distribution of liquid asset and
income, respectively, across U.S. homeowners in 2003. Clearly, a non-negligible
share of homeowners have liquid assets of at most $1000 and earn at most $30000
per year5.
The objective of this paper is to derive the implications of time-varying
liquidity constraints for the optimal conduct of monetary policy. In the long
2A wealth e¤ect of housing could also arise with nitely lived agents who dont care about
the utility of their descendents. However, the focus here is one the role of liquidity constraints.
3For the construction of housing equity withdrawal from the data, see Greenspan and
Kennedy (2005, 2007).
4Another use of housing equity would be to reoptimise the nancial portfolio and not to
spend it on consumption.
5Of course, what also matters is the history of assets and income. The percentage of
homeowners with liquid assets of at most $1000 and an annual income of at most $30000 is
0.12 in the sample. For cut-o¤ values of $6200 for liquid assets and $58800 for income as
chosen by Hurst and Sta¤ord (2004) the number is 0.35.
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Figure 2.1: Housing equity withdrawal in % of disposable income (solid line)
and the year-on-year real house price change (dashed line) in the US.
Notes: House prices deated by the CPI. Source: Greenspan and Kennedy (2005,
2007).
run nancial innovation should reduce the volatility of consumption and output
through an increase in the fraction of consumption smoothers in the economy.
However, in the short run house prices are volatile and a¤ect the capacity of
constrained households to borrow and thereby smooth consumption. Rising
house prices allow for higher equity withdrawal boosting consumption, while
falling house prices may make debtor households bankrupt or at least liquidity
constrained depressing consumption. The contribution of this paper is to take
account of the fact that higher house prices temporarily reduce the fraction of
constrained households, who become consumption smoothers, while falling house
prices temporarily increase it. The question asked is how monetary policy should
react to house prices and the corresponding time-varying liquidity constraints.
A wealth e¤ect from housing is derived by assuming that young home-owners
are liquidity constrained in the sense that they have high permanent income
relative to current income as it is typical for the life-cycle pattern of income.
To the extent that they are owner-occupiers a rise in house prices enables them
to extract the extra value and increase their consumption towards the optimal
level as implied by the permanent income hypothesis. This way house prices
increase aggregate demand and a¤ect the output gap and ination.
Our main results are that monetary policy should react to house price move-
ments due to their e¤ect on consumption by constrained agents. Moreover, with
time-varying liquidity constraints, the optimal weights on expected ination, the
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Figure 2.2: Housing equity withdrawal in % of disposable income (solid line)
and the year-on-year real house price change (dashed line) in the UK.
Notes: House prices deated by the CPI. Source: Datastream, own calculations.
output gap and house price changes are a¤ected. It is one of the main contribu-
tions of the chapter to work out explicitly this mechanism. To the best of our
knowledge this has not been looked at yet. Our results are of interest because
they show that it is not only the house prices per se that matter but also their
interaction with liquidity constraints and the associated e¤ect on the weight
on expected ination and output in the optimal interest rate rule. This gives
additional information to the policy maker about the strength of the optimal
interest rate response to house prices. The optimal interest rate response cru-
cially depends on the sensitivities of a change in the share of constrained agents
with respect to house prices, expected ination, the output gap and the interest
rate.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 relates the chapter to the
literature. Section 3 sets up a life-cycle model of consumption and derives an IS
curve with liquidity constraints. Section 4 derives the optimal monetary policy
in a New Keynesian framework and a wealth e¤ect from housing. Section 5
analyses the optimal interest rate response when there are time-varying liquidity
constraints. Section 6 discusses some robustness checks of the model and section
7 concludes.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of liquid assets in 2003 $ across U.S. homeowners.
Notes: Liquid assets are the sum of stocks, checking and savings accounts, money
market funds, certicate of deposits, government savings bonds, treasury bills,
bond funds and life insurances. Source: PSID, own calculations.
2.2 Related literature
The present chapter relates to a vast amount of papers analysing the relationship
of monetary policy and asset prices. Typically they dont distinguish between
di¤erent types of assets. Broadly speaking there are two main questions in the
context of the optimal response of monetary policy to asset prices. The rst is
how should monetary policy react to asset prices over and above a conventional
wealth e¤ect from asset prices, especially bubbles. Two approaches can be found
in the literature. One looks at demand e¤ects from asset prices (Bernanke
and Gertler, 1999, 2001; Cecchetti et al., 2000; Greenspan, 1999, 2004; Gruen,
Plumb and Stone, 2005; Filardo, 2004; Kent and Lowe, 1997; Kontonikas and
Montagnoli, 2006). In this approach a developing and consequently bursting
bubble might lead to household and rm bankruptcies, thereby a¤ecting the
output gap and ination. A su¢ ciently forward looking central bank might
want to take these repercussions into account. This argument suggests adjusting
the central banks forecast horizon for expected ination to include periods of
possible asset bubble bursts. There is disagreement, however, about how to
identify a bubble with certainty, about the timing, direction and strength of the
warranted interest rate response. Also a pre-emptive restrictive monetary policy
at the expense of current output might be hard to justify to the public.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of annual income in 2002 $ across U.S. homeowners.
Notes: Annual income is reported income in 2003 about tax year 2002. Source:
PSID, own calculations.
Another approach looks at the supply e¤ects of asset prices6. Bean (2004)
sets up a model drawing on results from a study by Borio and Lowe (2002) where
asset prices are correlated with the build-up of debt, which is used to nance
capital accumulation. An asset bubble crash leads to a credit crunch, which
a¤ects total factor productivity due to the lack of funds from intermediaries.
The output gap suddenly widens with adverse e¤ects on ination. One way
in which monetary policy can a¤ect the probability of a credit crunch is to
deter the debt build-up. In the model this can be achieved by a policy under
committment where the central bank a¤ects expectations of future output gaps.
A higher interest rate leads to a lower expected future output gap, which in turn
means slower capital accumulation today. Correspondingly, this limits the build-
up of debt. Thus, an interest rate response over and above the one warranted
by expected ination and the current output gap is optimal. Bordo and Jeanne
(2002) argue in a similar way that raising the interest rate today to bring down
debt accumulation can be considered an insurance against negative future supply
shocks when asset prices crash. In their model the real interest rate directly
a¤ects rms demand for debt.
The second question is about the mechanism of the wealth e¤ect, by which
asset prices (stock or house prices) a¤ect consumption and the appropriate pol-
icy reaction. When looking at the channel from asset prices to consumption it is
6At the intersection of demand and supply e¤ects is a paper by Smets (1997), who focuses
on the informational content in asset prices for expected ination.
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important to distinguish di¤erent classes of assets. House and stock prices can
have di¤erent e¤ects on consumption, e.g. stock-ownership is much less widely
spread than home-ownership in the U.S. Then again house price increases do
not necessarily always represent increases in net wealth. Yet many papers com-
monly just append a variable for asset prices to the IS equation or directly to
the interest rate rule. In contrast in this paper we focus on the role of house
prices and explicitly derive a wealth e¤ect from liquidity constrained consumers.
We can show that the precise channel by which house prices a¤ect consumption
is important because the weights on ination, output and house prices in the
interest rate rule are a¤ected. Our paper relates most closely to the papers by
Iacoviello (2004, 2005) and Monacelli (2006) who also derive a wealth e¤ect from
asset prices from a microfounded model. Some home-owners are assumed to be
impatient while others are patient. This determines who becomes borrower or
lender. In Iacoviello (2005) borrowing capacity is limited by the expected future
value of the house such that a house price increase results in higher consumption
by borrowers. He analyses optimal monetary policy using a postulated interest
rate rule, instead of deriving it from a loss function. In Monacelli (2006) bor-
rowers are constrained by the value of their general assets. He analyses to which
extent it might be optimal for a central bank, which maximises the weighted
utility of borrowers and savers, to deviate from price stability when ination
erodes the real value of debt and relaxes borrowing constraints. In our paper
liquidity constrained consumers are essentially dened by age and the value of
their home, which is intuitive and corresponds well with the life-cycle pattern of
income. It allows to let the share of constrained agents vary over time. In con-
trast, when constraints are dened by a xed rate of time preference this is not
possible. Moreover, we explicitly exclude the possibility of precautionary sav-
ing to be able to uniquely determine when liquidity constraints are binding and
when not. Furthermore, we derive an interest rate rule from loss minimisation
by the central bank.
Time-varying liquidity constraints have been considered e.g. by Deaton
(1991), Ludvigson (1999) and Pesaran and Smith (1995). Commonly, constraints
are a complex function of past income and net asset accumulation. This makes
most models with time-varying liquidity constraints intractable. Therefore we
aimed at nding a way to make liquidity constraints independent of past values
of income and assets and only conditional on the actual value of the home, albeit
at the expense of a more stylised setup.
To sum up, the contributions of our paper are rst to derive an explicit wealth
e¤ect from house prices on consumption via relaxing liquidity constraints, and
second to analyse optimal monetary policy when liquidity constraints vary over
time with house prices.
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2.3 A life-cycle model of consumption
Since the aim of the analysis is to evaluate monetary policy with time-varying
liquidity constraints in a standard New Keynesian setup we rst derive the IS
curve from individual utility optimisation taking into account that a fraction
of households is liquidity constrained and consumes out of current income and
liquid assets. Together with a Phillips curve and the central banks loss function
we derive the optimal monetary policy under constant and under time-varying
liquidity constraints.
Typically, the IS curve in the New Keynesian model is derived from house-
hold utility maximisation using a standard utility function such as the CES
utility. In this model we use a quadratic utility function because we want to
separate precautionary saving from liquidity constraints as a source for the high
correlation of current income and liquid assets with current consumption for
the constrained agents. The marginal utility of a quadratic utility function is
linear, which implies that the expected marginal utility of consumption equals
the marginal utility of expected consumption. An increase in uncertainty about
future consumption doesnt a¤ect marginal utility, i.e. certainty equivalence
holds. Therefore there is no e¤ect on current consumption and saving7. The
precautionary saving motive may result in consumption that follows current in-
come closely and is observationally similar to the e¤ect of liquidity constraints
(Carroll, 1997). An agent may save little and consumption might follow current
income closely either because the agent is liquidity constrained, or because the
agent is not liquidity constrained, and would want to borrow as much as neces-
sary to attain a smooth consumption path, but the percautionary saving motive
counteracts the desire to borrow just so that consumption and current income
are closely correlated.
Moreover, to have borrowing in equilibrium some agents must be constrained
and others not. Therefore we build a model with three types of agents: young,
middle-aged and old. In every period all types coexist and all are owner-
occupiers of their house.
The main challenge of the model is to avoid having to account for the history
of assets and income in determining when an agent is constrained. To this end
it is assumed that all agents face the same hump-shaped prole of life-time
income and only the young agents can be constrained. In each period the three
type of agents di¤er in the shares of aggregate income they receive as well as in
their share of total consumption. Thus each agents income is a xed share of
aggregate income and so is her consumption.
7With quadratic utility, however, possibly binding liquidity constraints in the future may
a¤ect current consumption (see Romers textbook, 2001). This will be ruled out by assump-
tion.
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2.3.1 Unconstrained consumers
Without any borrowing constraints a young agent in period t maximises her
life-time utility subject to her life-time budget constraint.
max
fC1t;C2t+1;C3t+2g
U (C1t; C2t+1; C3t+2) =
 
C1t   aC21t

+ Et
 
C2t+1   aC22t+1

+2Et
 
C3t+2   aC23t+2

s.t.
C1t +
1 + t+1
1 + it
C2t+1 +
1 + t+1
1 + it
1 + t+2
1 + it+1
C3t+2 =
Y1t +
1 + t+1
1 + it
Y2t+1 +
1 + t+1
1 + it
1 + t+2
1 + it+1
Y3t+2
where a > 0, Cjt and Yjt are consumption and income, respectively, of agent
j in period t, and j = f1; 2; 3g denotes young, middle-aged and old agents: a
determines the curvature of the utility function and  is the discount factor. it
is the nominal interest rate during period t and t+1 is the ination rate from
period t to t+1. The rst-order conditions with respect to C1t, C2t+1, C3t+2 are
1  2aC1t    = 0
Et (1  2aC2t+1)  Et1 + t+1
1 + it
 = 0
2Et (1  2aC3t+2)  Et1 + t+1
1 + it
1 + t+2
1 + it+1
 = 0
with  being the Lagrange multiplier. They can be written more compactly in
form of two Euler equations for the two adjacent periods:
C1t =  Et

1 + it
1 + t+1

1
2a
  C2t+1

+
1
2a
(2.1)
C2t+1 =  Et+1

1 + it+1
1 + t+2

1
2a
  C3t+2

+
1
2a
(2.2)
Note that in the special case of a constant real interest rate of zero and a
discount factor of one optimal consumption is equal across the three periods.
In the general case, log-linearisation of (2.1) and (2.2) results in the following
consumption equations
c1t = 1Etc2t+1   2 (it   Ett+1) (2.3)
c2t+1 = 3Et+1c3t+2   4 (it+1   Et+1t+2) (2.4)
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From here on lower case letters denote percentage deviations from trend. 1,
2, 3, 4 are positive linearisation constants
8. Given the nite lives of agents
one needs to specify what happens to housing wealth at the end of the third
period of an agents life. If there were no bequests a house price rise would have
an e¤ect on consumption of the old. Since they have only one last period to
live they would consume all their remaining housing wealth. Since the focus of
the paper is on the role of liquidity constraints as a housing wealth channel, we
shut down the wealth e¤ect from nite lives by implicitly assuming that agents
care for their descendants and bequeath their total remaining housing wealth at
the end of the third period to the middle-aged agents. This way housing wealth
always either exactly compensates for future imputed rents or is spread into the
innite future such that the net change in housing wealth is always zero.
2.3.2 Who is constrained and why?
To work out the role of liquidity constraints in the transmission mechanism from
house prices to consumption as simply as possible, it is assumed that only the
young agents can be constrained. Japelli (1990) reports not having a credit
history or the age of the loan applicant as the single most frequent reason given
by lenders when they rejected loan applications. Constrained young agents just
consume their current income plus liquid assets.
cc1t =  1y1t +  2bt
where  1,  2 are positive linearisation constants
9. Suppose that liquid assets
consist only of housing equity withdrawal, which in turn depends on the house
price change qt
bt = bqt
where b measures the extent to which an increase in house prices can be cashed
in.
In the model the young are constrained if desired consumption according
to utility optimisation and consumption smoothing cu1t is larger than current
income y1t and liquid assets bt, "cash-on-hand".
cu1t >  1y1t +  2bqt (2.5)
It is in addition assumed that the middle-aged and the old are always uncon-
81 =


1+i0
1+0

C20
C10
, 2 =
( 12a C20)
1+i0
1+0
C10
, 3 =


1+i0
1+0

C30
C20
, 4 =
( 12a C20)
1+i0
1+0
C20
,
U 0Cj;t+j 1 = 1  2aCj;t+j 1 > 0
9 1 =
Y10
C10
< 1;  2 =
B0
C10
< 1
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yk1tyc1t
h(yk1t)
Figure 2.5: Distribution function of income going to the young agents
strained. Typically, life-time income is hump-shaped (Attanasio and Brown-
ing, 1995; Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Carroll, 1997; Gourinchas and Parker,
2002) and consumption smoothing implies borrowing from the middle-aged when
young and paying o¤ the debt to the old in the following period10. However,
future income of young agents is not pledgeable, unless they use the value of
their house as collateral.
2.3.3 Time-varying liquidity constraints
As explained in the introduction, the capacity of homeowners to withdraw equity
from their houses varies over time as house prices vary. Therefore the share
of constrained agents in the economy should vary too. Typically in existing
models of monetary policy and house prices this aspect is not taken into account
and the share of constrained agents is xed (e.g. Iacoviello, 2005). We relax
this assumption by making the share of constrained agents a function of the
house price. While the total amount of income going to the young is xed, we
assume that the income going to an individual young agent k, denoted by yk1t, is
distributed over all young agents according to some distribution function h
 
yk1t

,
which is illustrated in gure 2.5.
For young agents with income below yc1t and a given amount of housing equity
withdrawal liquid assets are insu¢ cient to cover desired consumption and they
are constrained. For young agents with income above yc1t and a given amount
of housing equity withdrawal liquid asset are enough to cover desired consump-
tion and they are unconstrained. yc1t is the income of a young agent that just
makes her unconstrained, since her liquid assets just cover her desired optimal
consumption, cu1t =  1y
c
1t +  2bqt, which can be rearranged and substituted in
10The ability to borrow in equilibrium is the reason to have three types of agents.
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to
yc1t =
1
 1
Etc2t+1   2
 1
(it   Ett+1)   2b
 1
qt
The proportion of constrained agents is the share of young agents with income
below that critical level.
t =
yc1tZ
0
h
 
yk1t

dyk1t = F

1
 1
Etc2t+1   2
 1
(it   Ett+1)   2b
 1
qt

The share of constrained agents depends on expected future consumption, the
real interest rate and real house prices and not the entire history of income and
assets. This is by construction to keep the model tractable. When expected
future consumption rises, more agents are constrained ceteris paribus since op-
timal desired consumption rises. Similarly, when the nominal interest rate falls
or expected ination rises, the real interest rate falls ceteris paribus and optimal
desired consumption increases making more agents constrained. Finally, note
that the proportion of constrained agents falls ceteris paribus with higher house
prices. This is because higher house prices allow to withdraw equity from the
house, which can be used to nance consumption.
Note that the house price qt possibly also depends on the interest rate it.
qt = qt (it)
There are, however, arguments for why monetary policy should not expect to
be able to inuence asset prices via interest rate changes in a boom phase.
Even with higher interest rates expectations might be su¢ ciently optimistic to
overcompensate the dampening e¤ect of higher interest rates. As a start we will
take house prices to be exogenous, while later on relaxing that assumption.
2.3.4 Aggregation and equilibrium
Aggregate consumption ct is the sum of the weighted consumption of the young,
the consumption of the middle-aged and the old.
ct = (1  t) cu1t + tcc1t + c2t + c3t
As in the standard model of aggregate consumption we use the Euler equations
(2.3) and (2.4) to determine each agents consumption at t and aggregate, which
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yields
ct = (1  t) [1Etc2t+1   2 (it   Ett+1)] + t [ 1y1t +  2bqt]
+3Etc3t+1   4 (it   Ett+1)
+5Etc2t+1   6 (it   Ett+1)
The rst line is the weighted average of constrained and unconstrained young
agents, the second line the consumption of the middle-aged and the third line is
the consumption of the old. Consumption of the old is a usual Euler equation
under the assumption that the old care about consumption of their descendants,
who are middle-aged in the following period. This assumption is innocuous with
regard to the qualitative results of the model and follows the assumption above
about housing bequests11. It is justied by the focus of the paper on housing
as a means to bring forward consumption in time, as opposed to a wealth e¤ect
from housing from nite lives.
In equilibrium ct = yt must hold. In addition, as stated above, each agent
faces the same life-time pattern of income and receives a xed fraction sj of
aggregate income. In particular the income of the young y1t = s1yt. This
assumption does not mean that income is predetermined. Rather as in the
standard New Keynesian model it is demand determined. Also note that while
the share of income going to the young is a xed fraction of aggregate income, it
is is distributed over the young agents as specied above. Moreover, each agent
consumes a xed fraction xj of aggregate income12.
c1t = x1yt
c2t = x2yt
c3t = x3yt
Using these assumptions results in the following IS curve.
yt = (1  t) [1x2Etyt+1   2 (it   Ett+1)] + t [ 1s1yt +  2bqt]
+3x3Etyt+1   4 (it   Ett+1)
+5x2Etyt+1   6 (it   Ett+1) (2.6)
As usual the IS curve is increasing in the expected future output gap, decreas-
ing in the real interest rate. In addition and in contrast to the representative
11Consumption of the old could alternatively be set to their permanent income. This would,
however, also involve past values of income, the nominal interest rate and ination rate, as
well as the current ination rate. This would make no qualitative di¤erence, while decreasing
tractability of the model.
12Note that as long as x1 6= x2 6= x3, c10 6= c20 6= c30:
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innitely lived agent, there is an explicit wealth e¤ect from housing through
housing equity withdrawal by the constrained young agent. Moreover, aggre-
gate consumption and income depend on the share of constrained agents, on
their current income and on current ination due to consumption of the old.
The share of constrained agents is now
t = F

1x2
 1
Etyt+1   2
 1
(it   Ett+1)  b 2
 1
qt

(2.7)
2.4 Optimal monetary policy
In the long-run nancial liberalisation such as the introduction of housing eq-
uity withdrawal or gradually rising loan-to-value ratios (see Ortalo-Magné and
Rady, 1999) alleviate borrowing constraints on consumers if they have perma-
nently better access to credit. This could in principle help consumers to better
smooth consumption and therefore make output and ination less variable. Mon-
etary policy makers would welcome it provided nancial liberalisation doesnt
increase nancial instability. In this paper, however, we are concerned with
the short-run implications of nancial liberalisation. In particular, how should
monetary policy react to house price movements when, combined with nancial
innovations such as housing equity withdrawal, these result in variation of the
share of liquidity constrained consumers in the economy? When house prices
rise constrained consumers are able to expand their consumption, which leads
to a wealth e¤ect from house prices in the model above. However, at the same
time some previously constrained consumers become unconstrained, which re-
duces the share of constrained agents in the economy. From (2.6) it is then not
immediately clear anymore how the output gap is a¤ected and how monetary
policy should respond.
To analyse optimal monetary policy we use the standard New Keynesian
framework as e.g. in Walsh (2003). The key innovation in the paper is, however,
the modied IS curve (2.6), which is reproduced here for convenience.
yt = (1  t) [1x2Etyt+1   2 (it   Ett+1)] + t [ 1s1yt +  2bqt]
+3x3Etyt+1   4 (it   Ett+1)
+5x2Etyt+1   6 (it   Ett+1)
Furthermore, there is a forward looking Phillipscurve
t = Ett+1 + yt + et (2.8)
where t is ination from period t   1 to t,  is the discount factor, Et the
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expectations operator as of period t,  is the impact of the output gap on
ination and et is a cost push shock, which obeys
et = et 1 + bet (2.9)
with 0 <   1, and e^t is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and constant
nite variance. Finally, the central banks loss function is specied as
Lt =
1
2
Et
1X
i=0
i
 
2t+i + y
2
t+i

where  is the weight the central bank puts on deviations of the output gap
from target. Moreover, since the focus of the paper is on house prices and
time-varying liquidity constraints we keep it as simple as possible and derive the
optimal policy under discretion. To eliminate an ination bias under discretion
we assume a target for the output gap of zero. The monetary policy maker
minimises in every period the loss function Lt subject to the Phillipscurve using
the Lagrangean t.
t =
1
2
Et
1X
i=0
i
 
2t+i + y
2
t+i

+ t (t   Ett+1   yt   et)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier on the Phillipscurve. The IS curve is no
constraint on monetary policy as long as it can costlessly vary the nominal
interest rate13. The rst order conditions for optimal monetary policy are
w.r.t. t : 2t + t = 0
w.r.t. yt : 2yt   t = 0
which can be written more compactly as
t =  

yt (2.10)
The optimality condition states that the marginal cost in terms of higher ina-
tion must be equal to the marginal benet of a larger output gap. The central
bank trades o¤ ination against the output gap taking into account its prefer-
ences and the Phillipscurve. Using the optimality condition (2.10), the AR(1)
process of the cost push shock (2.9) and the Phillipscurve (2.8) in the IS curve
(2.6) yields the interest rate rule as a function of the optimal ination rate and
13Formally including the IS curve in the optimisation problem leads to a Lagrange multiplier
of zero for the IS curve constraint. Modications of the setup that only a¤ect the IS curve
dont change the rst order conditions of the standard setup under discretion.
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output gap as well as house prices14
it = fEtt+1 + fyyt + fqqt (2.11)
f = 1 +
(1  t 1s1)
 (6 + 4 + 2 (1  t))
> 1
fy =
((1  t)1x2 + 3x3 + 5x2) 
6 + 4 + 2 (1  t)
> 0
fq =
b 2t
6 + 4 + 2 (1  t)
> 0
The coe¢ cient on expected ination is positive and larger than 1, the coe¢ cient
on the output gap is positive and the coe¢ cient on the house price is positive
too. Moreover, using the optimality condition (2.10) in the denition of the
share of constrained agents results in
t = F

1x2
 1
yt   2
 1
it +
2
 1
Ett+1    2b
 1
qt

(2.12)
Note that the cumulative distribution function F has the following characteris-
tics.
@F
@it
 0i < 0
@F
@ (Ett+1)
 0 > 0
@F
@yt
 0y > 0
@F
@qt
 0q < 0
2.5 The role of liquidity constraints
Having derived an interest rate rule for monetary policy in (2.11) we are now
able to analyse the role of house prices and the associated time-varying liquidity
constraints in the conduct of monetary policy. From (2.11) it is clear that the
optimal policy implies an interest rate response to expected ination, output
and to house prices. Moreover, however, the weights on each variable depend on
the share of constrained agents t, which in turn varies with yt, it, Ett+1 and
qt.
14Details in the appendix.
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2.5.1 Constant liquidity constraints
Consider, as a benchmark, the simple case in which liquidity constraints are
constant, t = . Monetary policy should react to the house price shock with a
weight given by
dit
dqt

 const.
= fq =
b 2
6 + 4 + 2 (1  )
> 0 (2.13)
Monetary policy should thus respond to rising house prices by increasing the
interest rate. It has been shown that optimal monetary policy in the New
Keynesian model should respond to a wealth e¤ect from asset prices only to the
extent that they a¤ect the output gap and ination expectations (Bean, 2004).
This means the policy-maker neednt worry about asset prices themselves if
they have only little information about their movements. Instead it is enough to
observe the output gap and respond accordingly15. The same result holds here
when liquidity constraints are constant. The extent of an interest rate reaction
to house price movements depends on the degree to which liquidity constrained
consumers are able to convert the increased value of their home into cash and
ultimately into consumption, as denoted by the parameter b. Furthermore, the
optimal weights on the output gap and expected ination are given by (2.11) with
t = . While an increase in house prices or other factors a¤ecting consumption,
e.g. an increase in expected future income and consumption, could in principle
be judged only by their impact on the output gap the separation of the two e¤ects
in this model allows to get information about the strength of the appropriate
response since the coe¢ cients on aggregate consumption, i.e. in equilibrium the
output gap, and house prices di¤er.
For illustration, lets look at the extreme case where monetary policy has to
deal either with the young agents all constrained or all unconstrained. If  was
equal to 1 the optimal rule suggests reacting to the house price shock with a
weight
fqj=1 =
b 2
6 + 4
> 0
The weights on expected ination and the output gap are then given by
fj=1 = 1 +
(1   1s1)
 (6 + 4)
> 1
fyj=1 =
(3x3 + 5x2) 
6 + 4
> 0
If  turned out to be 0 we are back in the standard scenario without a wealth
15If asset prices conveyed better infomation about the underlying state of the economy than
the output gap, it might theoretically be better to respond to them and not the output gap.
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e¤ect from house prices. Consequently there is no separate response to house
prices required over and above the one to expected ination and the output gap
since there are only unconstrained agents, whose consumption doesnt react to
house prices. The weights on expected ination and the output gap are
fj=0 = 1 +

 (6 + 4 + 2)
> 1
fyj=0 =
(1x2 + 3x3 + 5x2) 
6 + 4 + 2
> 0
The model shows that the weights on expected ination and the output gap
di¤er in the two cases. Whether the response to expected ination is smaller
when all young agents are constrained,  = 1, compared to all agents being un-
constrained,  = 0, depends on the share of income s1 going to the constrained.
The fact that the constrained dont react to the interest rate would by itself call
for a stronger interest rate response to bring down ination by a given amount.
However, to bring down ination requires a fall in the outgap, i.e. income. Since
the constrained consume out of current income, their consumption falls and with
it the pressure on the output gap. This compensates for a stronger interest rate
response. In particular, the weight on expected ination is smaller when all
young agents are constrained if the share of income going to the young s1 is
large enough, as dened by s1 >
2
 1(2+4+6)
.
The weight on the output gap fy is larger when  = 1 than when  = 0 if
x2 <
23x3
1(6+4) 25
16. Key to understanding the e¤ect here is that a given shock
spreads to future expected output via the autocorrelated cost-push shock. An
increase in the expected output gap increases the share of constrained agents
because optimal consumption increases (see (2.12)). On the one hand the con-
strained dont respond to interest rate changes, which requires a stronger interest
rate response. On the other hand they dont respond to future expected output
anymore, so that pressure on the output gap is partly relieved. The pressure re-
lieved is small if the share of consumption in income of the middle-aged is small.
Then the rst e¤ect dominates and the weight on the output gap increases.
In addition, as will be discussed in the next section, if liquidity constraints
are time-varying, house price movements have an impact on the weights in the
optimal interest rate rule.
2.5.2 Time-varying liquidity constraints
Let now the share of liquidity constrained consumers be determined by (2.12).
While the rule still suggests increasing the interest rate in the face of an increase
in expected ination, the ouput gap or house prices, the weights on these vari-
16Since x2 = 0, it must hold that 1 (4 + 6) > 25.
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ables now vary with the share of constrained agents. The share of constrained
agents is positively related to the output gap and expected ination and nega-
tively related to the nominal interest rate and house prices. Consequently, each
weight is a function of expected ination, the output gap, the interest rate and
house prices. We will discuss each weight in turn.
2.5.2.1 The optimal weight on expected ination
When liquidity constraints are time-varying the optimal rule (2.11) not only
suggests responding to house prices, but also that the optimal weights on the
arguments in the rule change with the house price shock. Consider how the
optimal weight on expected ination changes with house price movements
df
dqt
=
0q (2    1s1 (2 + 4 + 6))
[ (6 + 4 + 2 (1  t))]2
Since 0q < 0 the weight on expected ination decreases with house prices if
the share of income going to the young s1 is small, s1 <
2
 1(2+4+6)
. Higher
house prices decrease the share of constrained agents because they allow to
extract equity from the house to nance consumption. Intuitively, the same
two e¤ects as above with constant  are at work. On the one hand, since
an agent doesnt react to changes in the interest rate when constrained, but
does so when unconstrained, a weaker interest rate response is required with
more agents unconstrained to bring down expected ination by a given amount.
On the other hand, the constrained consume out of current income and liquid
assets, while the unconstrained dont. An interest rate increase depresses current
income and lowers consumption by the constrained, which helps to bring down
ination through an indirect channel. When this channel is partially shut down
because more agents are unconstrained, it must be compensated by a stronger
direct interest rate channel. However, the smaller the share of income s1 going
to the constrained, the weaker is the indirect e¤ect that must be compensated.
If s1 <
2
 1(2+4+6)
the direct e¤ect more than compensates the indirect e¤ect
and a weaker response to expected ination is warranted.
Moreover, the weight on expected ination is a function of expected ination
itself, via its e¤ect on t.
df
d (Ett+1)
=
0 (2    1s1 (2 + 4 + 6))
[ (6 + 4 + 2 (1  t))]2
which is positive if the share of income going to the young s1 is small, s1 <
2
 1(2+4+6)
. To recapitulate the intuition, consider now an increase in the
share of constrained agents. Higher expected ination increases the share of
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constrained agents by raising the optimal level of consumption. Since the con-
strained dont react to changes in the interest rate, a stronger interest rate
response is required. On the other hand, the newly constrained consume out
of current income and liquid assets. An interest rate increase depresses their
income and as such lowers consumption by the constrained. This e¤ect however
is smaller the smaller the share of income s1 going to the constrained, calling
for a stronger rate increase.
Similarly, the weight on expected ination also increases with the output gap
if s1 <
2
 1(2+4+6)
:
df
dyt
=
0y (2    1s1 (2 + 4 + 6))
[ (6 + 4 + 2 (1  t))]2
Again with more agents constrained there are two e¤ects: On the one hand a
stronger interest rate increase is necessary to bring down expected ination since
fewer agents react to interest rate changes. On the other hand, the constrained
react indirectly to the interest rate change as far as it a¤ects aggregate income.
If the indirect e¤ect is small, because a small share of aggregate income goes to
the constrained, then the rst e¤ect outweighs the second one and a stronger
interest rate response is warranted.
Finally the optimal weight on expected ination decreases with the interest
rate if s1 <
2
 1(2+4+6)
.
df
dit
=
0i (2    1s1 (2 + 4 + 6))
[ (6 + 4 + 2 (1  t))]2
The intuition is again the same as in the previous cases. Note that the interest
rate e¤ect and the house price e¤ect tend to o¤set the other two, since 0 > 0,
0y > 0 and 
0
i < 0, 
0
q < 0, and the strength of each e¤ect crucially depends on
the sensitivities 0, 
0
y, 
0
i and 
0
i.
2.5.2.2 The optimal weight on the output gap
House price changes have an impact on the share of constrained agents and
therefore on the optimal weight on the output gap.
dfy
dqt
=
0q [23x3   x2 (1 (4 + 6)  25)]
[6 + 4 + 2 (1  t)]2
The intuition is analogous to the case where either all the young are constrained
or no one is constrained. The weight on output decreases with the house price
if the share of consumption in aggregate income when middle-aged is small, as
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dened by x2 <
23x3
1(6+4) 25
17. Higher house prices reduce the proportion
of constrained agents. On the one hand these newly unconstrained respond to
interest rate changes, which allows to achieve a given reduction in the output gap
with a smaller interest rate increase. On the other hand, the newly unconstrained
also react to their expected future consumption, which increases with x2. This
e¤ect calls for a stronger interest rate increase to bring down the output gap by
a given amount. However, if this e¤ect is small, the rst e¤ect dominates and a
weaker interest rate response is required.
The optimal weight on the output gap reacts to an increase in the output
gap as follows.
dfy
dyt
=
0y [23x3   x2 (1 (4 + 6)  25)]
[6 + 4 + 2 (1  t)]2
which is positive if x2 <
23x3
1(6+4) 25 . The intuition is the same as above.
The optimal weight on output changes with respect to expected ination and
the interest rate in an analogous manner.
dfy
d (Ett+1)
=
0 [23x3   x2 (1 (4 + 6)  25)]
[6 + 4 + 2 (1  t)]2
dfy
dit
=
0i [23x3   x2 (1 (4 + 6)  25)]
[6 + 4 + 2 (1  t)]2
2.5.2.3 The optimal weight on house prices
The optimal weight on house prices is a function of house prices themselves.
dfq
dqt
=
0q 2b (2 + 4 + 6)
[6 + 4 + 2 (1  t)]2
< 0
This is because with rising house prices fewer agents are constrained, who dont
react to house prices. In this case consumption and the output do increase. After
all, becoming unconstrained means that consumption of the young has increased
up to or beyond the optimal level of consumption. However, this increase in
consumption is now captured by the increase in the output gap. Therefore a
separate response to house prices is not warranted. The di¤erence lies in the
coe¢ cients on house prices and the output gap. Pressure on the output gap due
to a wealth e¤ect from house prices requires a slightly di¤erent response than
pressure due to an increase in expected future income and consumption.
Furthermore, the optimal weight on house prices increases with expected
17Remember that since x2 = 0, it must hold that 1 (4 + 6) > 25.
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ination.
dfq
d (Ett+1)
=
0 2b (2 + 4 + 6)
[6 + 4 + 2 (1  t)]2
> 0
This is because more agents are constrained, who react to house price increases.
The optimal weight also increases with the output gap
dfq
dyt
=
0y 2b (2 + 4 + 6)
[6 + 4 + 2 (1  t)]2
> 0
and decreases with the interest rate. A higher interest rate reduces the propor-
tion of constrained agents, who react to changes in house prices.
dfq
dit
=
0i 2b (2 + 4 + 6)
[6 + 4 + 2 (1  t)]2
< 0
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 House prices are a¤ected by the interest rate
A standard present-value model for house prices would predict that the current
house price is a function of the real interest rate18.
qt =  3Etqt+1    4 (it   Ett+1) + t
Then the fall in the share of constrained agents following an interest rate increase
is smaller because in addition to the e¤ect of a lower optimal level of consumption
house prices fall reducing liquid assets. Conversely, an interest rate decrease
leads to a smaller increase in the share of constrained agents because higher
house prices compensate for the increased desired consumption level.
0ij 4=0 < 
0
ij 4>0
Furthermore, for any given ination expectation, output gap or lagged house
price changes the optimal interest rate rule requires a smaller response because
any house price increase is immediately dampened by an interest rate increase.
2.6.2 House prices follow an autoregressive process
So far, we have not specied a time-series process for house prices. However,
empirically the growth rate of house prices has been found to be fairly strongly
autocorrelated (see Englund and Ioannides, 1997; Case and Shiller, 1989, 1990;
Meese and Wallace, 1994). We take account of this empirical regularity by also
18Assume for simplicity that the expected future change in rents is zero .
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considering the following process for house prices
qt = qt 1 + t
where qt 1 is the the lagged percentage deviation from steady-state,  is the
autocorrelation coe¢ cient and t is the house price shock. Then the share of
constrained agents becomes
ARt = F

1x2
 1
yt   2
 1
(it   Ett+1)   2b
 1
qt 1    2b
 1
t

The analysis proceeds as in the case of a random walk for house prices above.
New is however that lagged house price changes now appear in the interest rate
rule and in the dention of the share of constrained agents ARt . The optimal
rule is now
it = fEtt+1 + fyyt + fq (qt 1 + t)
Clearly all results derived in the case of a random walk continue to hold with
the addition that monetary policy should also react to lagged asset prices with
a weight fq. The strength of the response to lagged changes in house prices
increases with the autoregressive parameter  . Moreover the weight on past
house prices varies with ARt , i.e. with expected ination, the output gap, the
interest rate, lagged house prices themselves and the current house price shock.
In particular,
dfq
d (qt 1)
=
0qt 1 2b (2 + 4 + 6)
[6 + 4 + 2 (1  t)]2
< 0
The higher lagged house prices the smaller is the required interest rate response
to them. The reason is that the higher are lagged house prices the fewer agents
are constrained for a given current house price shock. Unconstrained agents
dont react to house prices anymore. Moreover, only those who are uncon-
strained react to interest rate changes. Constrained agents keep on consuming
out of their liquid assets. With a higher share of unconstrained agents, a smaller
interest rate change is needed to o¤set the wealth e¤ect from house prices. The
e¤ects of expected ination, output gap and interest rate on the optimal weight
on past asset prices follow analogously.
Furthermore, the optimal weights on expected ination and the output gap
are now a¤ected by the presence of lagged house prices.
df
dqt 1
=
0qt 1 (2    1s1 (2 + 4 + 6))
[ (6 + 4 + 2 (1  t))]2
The weight on expected ination decreases with lagged house prices if s1 <
2
 1(2+4+6)
, where the intuition is the same as above. The weight on the output
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gap is a¤ected in an analogous manner to the case where house price follow a
random walk.
2.6.3 Discussion of some model assumptions
The role of bequests In the model it is assumed that the old generation
bequeath their houses to their middle-aged descendants. This assumption rules
out a wealth e¤ect on consumption of the old. Abolishing housing bequests from
the old would introduce another wealth channel into the model. This, however,
would be separate from the wealth e¤ect from house prices through relaxing
liquidity constraints of the young and would not a¤ect the results derived with
regard to the optimal weights on the output gap and expected ination. How-
ever, the weight on house prices themselves would probably increase since more
agents would respond to an increase in house prices by expanding consumption.
Furthermore, abolishing the bequest motive in terms of the old caring for con-
sumption of their middle-aged descendants would call for specifying consumption
of the old in a di¤erent way. For example the old could consume their perma-
nent income, which, however would introduce lags of the interest rate, ination
and output. This wouldnt change the results qualitatively while rendering the
model more complicated.
Possibility of default of middle-aged While carrying out the analysis above
we have maintained the assumption that the middle-aged and the old are always
unconstrained. In particular, the assumption was that their respective income
is always more than enough to cover desired consumption and desired lending
to the young. In addition there is no default on debt. Both assumptions allow
to focus solely on the role of house prices as collateral in relaxing liquidity
constraints. Default on the part of the middle-aged would have an e¤ect if the
repayment was used to nance consumption of the old. Then, a fall in house
prices below the contracted loan-to-value ratio would depress consumption of the
old in addition to the reduction in consumption by the constrained young. To
connect the possibility of default to house prices one could introduce a fourth
generation between the middle-aged and the old. The income of the middle-
aged might not be su¢ cient to cover both consumption and repayment of the
loan. They would have to roll over their loan by borrowing from the additional
generation again with their housing value as collateral, the same mechanism
as for borrowing by the young. If house prices fell, the middle-aged wouldnt
be able to cover their repayment by a new loan and would default. However,
even without appealing to these arguments we have shown that house prices do
matter in the optimal conduct of monetary policy.
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Distinction between bubble and fundamental price change So far we
havent made any assumption about the source of a house price increase. It could
be fundamentally justied or it could be driven by non-fundamental factors.
Whether this matters for the model depends on the expectations of the young
borrowers and the middle-aged lenders about the persistence of the house price
boom. If both expect it to last at least until the next period borrowers and
lenders are happy to accept the value of the house as collateral even though at
some point in time it might fall considerably. This again results from the role
of housing as collateral, which allows to bring forward consumption from later
periods. Under this view it doesnt matter whether consumers believe house
prices are driven by fundamental or non-fundamental factors.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have derived a wealth e¤ect from house prices through their role
as collateral to nance consumption. Housing value serves as a means to bring
forward consumption in time without being of intrinsic value. Since house prices
vary, so does the value of collateral and therefore the proportion of constrained
agents varies too. Furthermore, the share of constrained agents depends on
house prices, expected ination, the output gap and the interest rate. Since
constrained and unconstrained agents react di¤erently to house price changes,
expected future output gap, expected ination and interest rate changes, the
actual share of constrained agents is important for the weights monetary policy
should put on each of these factors when setting interest rates. In sum, the
analysis shows that the optimal weights on expected ination, the output gap
and house price changes vary over time, in turn depending on the values for
expected ination, the output gap and house price changes. Therefore house
prices do seem to play a role in the optimal response of monetary policy to house
prices over and above their e¤ect on aggregate demand and the output gap. This
result has been derived without appealing to supply side e¤ects from defaults
on debt or the informational content in asset prices about future productivity
or ination.
The model has also demonstrated that it is important where a wealth e¤ect
comes from. If it results from relaxed liquidity constraints there is the additional
e¤ect on the optimal weights on ination, output and house prices in the interest
rate rule. Therefore we have worked out another factor that is relevant for an
appropriate interest rate response in the face of changes in expected ination,
the output gap and house prices.
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Appendix 2.A Derivation of the optimal inter-
est rate rule
The solution for optimal monetary policy are expressions for the output gap
and ination in only the state variables. Under discretion et is the only relevant
state variable such that a conjectured solution is of the form
yt = et (2.14)
From the optimality condition (2.10)
t =  

yt
it follows
t =  

et
Plugging this into the Phillipscurve (2.8) yields
yt =
  

1 + 
2

et (2.15)
Equating coe¢ cients from (2.14) and (2.15) results in
 =
 
2 +  (1  )
Consequently,
yt =
 
2 +  (1  )et (2.16)
and
t =

2 +  (1  )et (2.17)
To arrive at the optimal interest rule use (2.16) and (2.17) together with the
AR(1) process for the cost push shock in the IS curve (2.6).
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Chapter 3
U.S. stock prices and moral
hazard: Did the Fed contribute
to the bubble in the late 1990s?
3.1 Introduction
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Figure 3.1: Real S&P 500 (solid line) and real S&P 500 dividend payments index
(dashed line).
Notes: Quarterly data, 1950 Q1 to 2005 Q4. Source: Standard and Poors.
Figure (3.1) shows the quarterly real S&P 500 stock price index along with
the S&P 500 dividend payments index from 1950 to 2005. What stands clearly
out is the huge peak in stock prices in the late 1990s. The aim of this paper is to
test whether the Fed under its chairman Alan Greenspan1 indirectly contributed
1Alan Greenspan served as chairman of the Fed from 11 August 1987 to 31 January 2006
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to the bubble. The Fed may have done so because investors believed the Fed
will bail them out in case of a stock market crash by injecting liquidity and
stabilizing stock prices. Investors may have come to have this belief because the
Fed has acted accordingly after the stock market crash on the Black Monday of
October 1987 and after the LTCM crisis in September 19982. This hypothesis,
which is known as the Greenspan-put, has been supported by leading academics
and the media.
 Cecchetti et al (2000): Many analysts have expressed concern that central
banks may have created moral hazard by creating expectations that they
would take remedial policy action if asset prices fall.
 Mussa (2003): To this was added the market perception reinforced by
the Feds response to the LTCM crisis, that US monetary policy would act
aggressively to countervail any sharp sell-o¤ in equity markets making
investment in equities appear to have some characteristics of a one-way
bet.
 Filardo (2004): . . . investors are likely to take too much risk during
the good times because investors may perceive the monetary authority as
providing free downside risk insurance in the case of bad times  in the
language of options, the monetary authority is o¤ering an unpriced put.
 Mishkin and White (2003): A fourth problem with too much focus on
the stock market is that it may create a form of moral hazard. Knowing
that the central bank is likely to prop up the stock market if it crashes,
the markets are then more likely to bid up stock prices. This might help
facilitate excessive valuation of stocks and help encourage a stock market
bubble that might crash later. . . 
 Borio and Lowe (2003): Moreover, reaction functions that are seen to
imply asymmetric responses, lowering rates or providing ample liquidity
when problems materialize but not raising rates as imbalances build up,
can be rather insidious in the longer run. They promote a form of moral
hazard that can sow the seeds of instability. . . 
 Financial Times (2001): Its o¢ cial: there is a Greenspan put option.
(...) By showing investors he [Greenspan] will rescue them come what
2"...central banks do not respond to gradually declining asset prices. We do not respond to
gradually rising asset prices. We do respond to sharply reduced asset prices, which will create
a seizing up of liquidity in the system." Greenspan (1999)
"...Instead of trying to contain a putative bubble by drastic actions with largely unpre-
dictable consequences, we chose, as we noted in our mid-1999 congressional testimony to focus
on policies to mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the
next expansion". Greenspan (2004)
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may, he is encouraging excessive risk-taking and the formation of future
bubbles.
 The Economist (1999): In recent years, Mr Greenspan has been taking
a big risk by not having tightened policy when he rst thought a bubble
might be forming, or subsequently. There were plenty of signs of over-
heating, such as rampant consumer borrowing, that he could have used
to justify higher interest rates. His second risky move was to cut rates
three times last autumn in response to nancial turmoil, when policy was
already lax, and then to fail to take back this easing as soon as nancial
markets had stabilised. The Fed has thereby fostered the impression that
it will slash interest rates when share prices fall sharply, but not increase
rates when they shoot up. This apparent asymmetry has created a form
of moral hazard that encourages investors to take bigger risks.
and
Mr Greenspans condence that he can use monetary policy to prevent
a deep recession if share prices crash exposes an awkward asymmetry in
the way central banks respond to asset prices. They are reluctant to raise
interest rates to prevent a bubble, but they are quick to cut rates if nancial
markets tremble. Last autumn, in the wake of Russias default and a slide
in share prices, the Fed swiftly cut rates, saying it wanted to prevent a
credit crunch. As a result, share prices soared to new highs. The Fed
has inadvertently created a sort of moral hazard. If investors believe that
monetary policy will underpin share prices, they will take bigger risks.
 The Economist (2006): If the Fed always cuts interest rates when asset
prices tumble, but never raises them when they soar, then investors will
be encouraged to take bigger risks.
Of course no one claims that moral hazard induced by monetary policy ac-
tions was solely responsible for the surge in stock prices in the late 1990s. Shiller
(2001) neatly summarizes a number of factors that may have played a role in
pushing up stock prices: the internet as a new technology, the spreading of the
capitalist system in the world (especially China opening the economy to market
oriented ideas), management and employee stock options, capital gains tax cut
by a republican congress, the baby boom after WW II3, and various psycholog-
ical factors such as increased positive coverage of business by the media or the
decline of ination. Next to these factors, some authors put forward reasons
3Birth rates in 1946-1966 were very high. These people now save for their retirement by
investing in stocks. In addition demand for goods is generally high with a larger population
which results in higher prots of rms and thus a high price-earnings ratio (Shiller, 2001).
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such as the decline in macroeconomic volatility, which reduces the risk-premium
and raises stock prices (Lettau, Ludvigson and Wachter, 2006). While these
explanations surely deserve attention, the moral hazard argument is especially
interesting because it has a direct bearing on the more general discussion about
whether monetary policy should react to asset prices. Opinions on this mat-
ter can roughly be grouped around three persons. Ben Bernanke, the current
chairman of the Fed, believes that asset prices should play no role in monetary
policy making over and above their impact on the ination forecast (Bernanke
and Gertler, 2001). In contrast, Stephen Cecchetti argues that monetary policy
can and should take asset prices into account when setting interest rates and
react preemptively to a developing bubble. The reason is that once asset prices
crash output might decline and as a result consumer price ination might be
a¤ected. A su¢ ciently forward looking central bank might wish to avoid the
extra volatility in output and ination resulting from the asset price crash (Cec-
chetti et al., 2000). Finally, Alan Greenspan holds the view that it is impossible
to identify asset price misalignments in the rst place. Consequently, a central
bank cannot react to asset price movements. All it can do is to stand ready
and limit the damage after a stock market crash by providing liquidity to the
market (Greenspan, 1999; Greenspan, 2004)4. Not only disagree Cecchetti et
al. (2000) with the view that asset price bubbles are impossible to identify5,
but Greenspans position might have lead to the alleged moral hazard behaviour
on the part of investors. If that was true monetary policy-makers might rather
opt for acting preemptively against rapidly rising asset prices to avoid both the
moral hazard problem and any adverse e¤ects on output and ination should
the bubble burst.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we
outline our empirical strategy, section 3 gives a literature overview, section 4
describes the data, section 5 presents unit root tests and cointegration analysis,
section 6 reports results from a state-space estimation to identify asset price
misalignments for the years 1950 to 2005. The seventh section uses theoretical
models to derive measures of moral hazard in monetary policy and empirically
tests their inuence on U.S. stock prices. Section 8 concludes.
3.2 Empirical strategy
To be able to analyse factors that might have had an impact on stock price
bubbles, the bubble must be identied rst. In the literature the term bubble
4See footnote 2.
5Cecchetti et al. (2000) argue that a central bank uses the output gap to gauge ination,
which requires a judgement about unobserved output. Analogously it shouldnt be impossible
to arrive at a judgement about the fundamental value of asset prices.
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is mostly used for any kind of variation in asset prices that cant be explained
by fundamentals, as derived from some model. Following this denition of a
bubble we start from the standard present value model. The stock price is the
discounted sum of expected future dividend payments. Instead of imposing the
transversality condition we explicitly allow for a non-fundamental term in the
stock price equation, which we call bubble. This formulation allows to use unit
root and cointegration tests as a preliminary check for bubbles. After having
established that bubbles cant be ruled out by these tests we cast the problem
in terms of a state-space model and use the Kalman lter technique to get an
explicit estimate of the unobserved bubble term.
In the second stage of our analysis the identied bubble term is used to test
whether investor moral hazard induced by the Feds past actions had any impact
on it. To do so we rely on two theoretical models that address the problem of
moral hazard in U.S. monetary policy. We construct various measures of moral
hazard on the basis of these models and test whether they had an impact on the
bubble term itself or whether they are signicant in the stock price equation.
Our results are that unit root and cointegration tests indicate the presence
of a bubble and we are indeed able to identify a statistically signicant bubble
component in U.S. stock prices in the late 1990s using the state-space approach.
Regarding the measures of moral hazard none of them turns out to have a
signicant impact on either the bubble term itself or on stock prices directly.
There are three basic criticisms to our approach. First, as Cogley (1999)
argues, researchers trying to detect a bubble, e.g. at central banks, have di¢ -
culties in observationally distinguishing a bubble from an omitted unobserved
fundamental. This is an important criticism which in principal applies to our
approach. However, the crucial di¤erence is that we take the identication of the
bubble one step further and use it to test one specic hypothesis, the Greenspan
put hypothesis. That is, we treat the unobserved moral hazard behaviour on
the part of investors as the omitted variable and test whether it had any impact
on the identied bubble. In addition to that, Cecchetti et als (2000) argument
applies. Estimating the output gap requires a judgement about the level of po-
tential output, which is common practice at central banks. Equally, identifying
a bubble requires a judgement about the fundamentals, which has its problems
but which is not impossible. Second, our test for a bubble is principally also a
test of the adequacy of the present value model. However, this criticism applies
only if one uses the present value to reject the presence of the bubble. Then, one
wouldnt know whether the rejection is due to there truly being no bubble or
due to the model being inadequate. In contrast, not rejecting a bubble poses no
problem in this regard. However, third, rejecting the moral hazard hypothesis
might mean the measures of moral hazard are right but have truly no statis-
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tically signicant impact. Or the measures of moral hazard are false. Since
moral hazard behaviour is not observable we must rely on indirect measures.
The next best option is then to use theory to arrive at those measures, which is
our approach. At the very least, our results indicate that the predictions of the
theoretical models of Miller, Weller and Zhang (2002) and Illing (2001) are not
conrmed by the data.
3.3 Related literature
There are various approaches in the literature to testing for asset price bubbles6.
The starting point is mostly the present value model of stock prices. The earliest
tests by Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) were variance bounds test.
Their intuition is that the ex-ante expected stock price should be less volatile
than the ex-post realised value calculated from realised dividend payments be-
cause it contains the forecast error of dividends. This implies a restriction on the
variances of the observed prices at time t and their ex-post realised values which
can be tested. Their nding is that the variance restriction is violated and the
existence of bubbles cant be ruled out. Of course, all tests for bubbles based on
the present value model are at the same time tests of the present value model
itself. West (1987) proposed a way to overcome this di¢ culty. The idea is to ob-
tain the parameters of the present value model by estimating an Euler equation
and an autoregressive process for dividends. Misspecication tests are applied
to ensure the validity of the estimates. They can then be used to re-construct
the relation between the stock price and fundamentals. In a second step stock
prices can be estimated using the present value model. If the two estimated
relationships di¤er it is possible to distinguish model misspecication and the
presence of a bubble. West cant rule out the presence of a bubble either. An-
other strand of the literature exploits unit root and cointegration characteristics
of the present value model taking into account possible unobservables. Notably
Diba and Grossman (1987, 1988a, 1988b) follow this approach and see whether
they can rule out an explosive rational bubble in stock prices7. After applying
various unit root and cointegration tests they conclude that stock prices dont
have an explosive rational bubble component. Psaradakis, Sola and Spagnolo
(2001) examine wholesale prices and the money supply during the German hy-
perination. They apply a specic unit root test and nd an explosive root in
their data. This approach has been criticised by Evans (1991) who presents an
example of a periodically collapsing bubble which never bursts. By subjecting
a simulated periodically collapsing bubble to Diba and Grossmans (1988) test
6Gurkaynak (2005) provides a thorough overview of empirical tests for asset price bubbles.
7This approach will be discussed in detail and applied below.
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he shows that unit roots tests fail to detect this kind of bubble8. The literature
on markov-switching processes in stock prices and dividends tries to overcome
this problem. Hall, Psaradakis and Sola (1999) use a markov-switching model to
identify periods when asset prices are in an explosive regime while fundamentals
are not. They apply it to consumer prices, the money supply and the exchange
rate and identify periods of rational explosive bubbles in consumer prices and
the exchange rate. Psaradakis, Sola and Spagnolo (2004) use a Markov error-
correction model to identify periods of collapsing bubbles and conclude against
their existence9. Instead of concentrating on modelling periodic collapses of bub-
bles, Wu (1995, 1997) focuses on the fact that the bubble is unobserved by the
econometrician and proposes a Kalman lter approach to testing for bubbles.
The Kalman lter allows for the estimation of an unobserved variable within a
state-space model, e.g. the bubble term in the present value model. Applying
this technique to U.S. exchange rate data he nds no support for the existence
of bubbles. However, testing for a bubble in U.S. stock prices in the S&P 500 he
can identify stock price bubbles. Pastor and Veronesi (2006) employ a standard
stock valuation model and show that once one takes into account uncertainty
about future dividend growth the observed values of the NASDAQ index can be
replicated by calibrating their model. Their argument is that since the price-
dividend ratio is a convex function of the growth rate of dividends it is increasing
in the uncertainty about future dividend growth. To the extent that the late
1990s in the U.S. were characterised by high uncertainty about future rm prof-
its, especially in the information and communications sector, their model can
explain high stock prices in the NASDAQ without recurring to a bubble.
In contrast there is hardly any literature on moral hazard and monetary
policy. Only four papers address the problem of theoretically modelling moral
hazard in monetary policy. Illing (2001) shows why it may be rational for a
central bank to react asymmetrically to asset price movements building on a
framework by Allen and Gale (2000). Because it is costly to let highly leveraged
rms go bankrupt on a large scale the central bank has an incentive to inject
liquidity in case of an aggregated shock. This incentive is higher, the higher
the leverage in the economy. Rational investors will anticipate the resulting
capital gain from the reduced real debt burden and include it in their stock
valuation. In a related paper Cao and Illing (2007) analyse the incentives for
nancial market actors to free-ride on liquidity provision by the central bank,
8Taylor and Peel (1998) use a unit root test that is robust to periodically collapsing com-
ponents in stock prices and reject the hypothesis of a stock price bubble in the U.S. Sarno and
Taylor (1999) apply the same test to East Asian stock price indices and conrm the existence
of bubbles there.
9Furthermore, Froot and Obstfeld (1991) propose a model where the stock price bubble
is a function of dividends, which is called an intrinsic bubble. Their own test and a test by
Dri¢ l and Sola (1998) yields ambiguous results regarding the presence of intrinsic bubbles.
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which can lead to excessive risk-taking. Furthermore, Sauer (2007) shows in a
model of optimal liquidity provision by the central bank that the anticipation
of which by investors results in more investment into the possibly less liquid
asset than without the central bank intervention. In addition, Miller, Weller
and Zhang (2002) can explain the observed low risk-premium in the late 1990s
by incorporating the value of an implicit insurance of investors against downside
risk. Related but not modelling stock price misalignments is the paper by Borio
and Lowe (2002). They study ex-ante indicators of nancial crises and show that
the deviation of the ratio of credit to GDP from trend is a fairly good indicator
of nancial crises.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, there is no paper which tries to evaluate
empirically the hypothesis of moral hazard in monetary policy.
In the following we set up the present value model of stock prices and apply
unit root and cointegration tests on U.S. stock price data. After being able
to reject the null hypothesis of no bubble we proceed to estimating a state-
space model using the Kalman lter which allows to obtain an actual series with
condence bands for the bubble term and use measures of moral hazard to test
the moral hazard hypothesis.
3.4 Data
The stock price index is the S&P 500 composite index from 1950 Q1 to 2005
Q4. The dividend series is the S&P 500 dividend series from 1950 Q1 to 2005
Q4, backed out from the S&P 500 dividend yield. Because it is not seasonally
adjusted we also used the seasonally adjusted U.S. net corporate dividend pay-
ments from 1950 Q1 to 2005 Q4 as a cross-check. It comes from the National
Income and Product Accounts Table 1.12 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis
and includes dividend payments by domestic nancial and nonnancial rms,
the farm sector and foreign subsidiaries received by U.S. residents. It is a broader
measure for dividends than associated with the S&P 500 composite index. All
series are deated by the seasonally adjusted U.S. consumer price index. The
real interest rate is the annualized three-month U.S. treasury bill rate minus the
CPI based ination rate.
Data for the various measures of moral hazard are constructed from di¤erent
sources. The stock market crash probability is Shillers Crash Condence Index
from a survey among institutional investors available on his website10. It is the
percentage of respondents who think that the probability of a stock market crash
in the next six months is less than 10%. The data are collected semi-annually
10For more information on Shillers investor condence indices:
http://icf.som.yale.edu/condence.index/
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from October 1989 to April 2001 and monthly afterwards. To arrive at quarterly
data to make frequencies match, we have linearly interpolated Shillers survey
data from October 1989 to April 2001 and averaged from July 2001 onwards.
Miller, Weller and Zhangs (2002) measure of moral hazard has been constructed
by taking the ratio of the level of current dividends to their level in 1987 Q4,
immediately after the crash, and to their level at 79% of the stock price peak
in 1998 Q2. Real credit growth is the real growth of total U.S. non-federal debt
outstanding deated by the CPI. The debt gap measure has been constructed by
applying the HP-lter to the ratio of total non-nancial sector debt outstanding
to seasonally adjusted GDP with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
3.5 The present value model and testable im-
plications for bubbles
As a preliminary test of bubbles in U.S. stock prices we follow Diba and Gross-
man (1988a) who use the standard present value model to derive testable im-
plications for bubbles. They explicitly allow for an unobserved variable that
might inuence the stock price over and above dividends and a possible bubble.
In their analysis they use data up to 1986 and can rule out rational explosive
bubbles. In contrast, extending the data range up to 2005 we cant rule out
the existence of either an unobserved variable inuencing stock prices or the
presence of a bubble.
Consider the stock price according to the present value model
Pt = (1 +R)
 1Et (Pt+1 +Dt + ut)
where Pt is the stock price at the beginning of period t, Dt is the dividend paid
during period t, R is the constant real interest rate11 and ut is a variable that is
unobserved by the researcher but taken into account by market participants. The
fundamental stock price Ft is the discounted sum of expected future dividends
Dt plus the unobserved variable ut:
Ft =
1X
i=0
(1 +R) iEt(Dt+i + ut+i)
The general solution to the stock price equation is
Pt =
1X
i=0
(1 +R) iEt(Dt+i + ut+i) +Bt
11Assuming a constant real interest rate is standard in the literature. As a check we ran all
tests allowing for a time-varying real interest rate, and the results didnt change qualitatively.
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where Bt is the bubble term and obeys
EtBt+1 = (1 +R)Bt
Note that since 1+R > 1 the present value model predicts explosive bubbles, i.e.
the bubble should grow at the rate of real interest. Given this setup Diba and
Grossman (1988a) derive testable implications for the presence of a bubble in
stock prices. If there are no bubbles and if, in addition, the rst di¤erences of the
unobservable and the rst di¤erences of dividends are stationary, then the rst
di¤erences of stock prices should be stationary too. Moreover, if there are no
bubbles and the unobservable is stationary in levels and dividends are stationary
in rst di¤erences then stock prices and dividends should be cointegrated of order
(1,1). More formally,
If Bt = 0 8t and ut  I(0) and Dt  I(0); then Pt  I(0) (3.1)
If Bt = 0 8t and ut  I(0) and Dt  I(0); then
 
Pt
Dt
!
 CI(1; 1) (3.2)
Conrming these results would be evidence against the existence of rational
bubbles. Rejecting them, however, doesnt necessarily point to the existence
of bubbles since, in the rst case, it could be that the rst di¤erences of the
unobservable are non-stationary, while in the second case, the level of the unob-
servable could be non-stationary.
In the following we report results of unit root tests on stock prices and
dividends, as well as results of cointegration tests on stock prices and dividends12.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests have been carried out on the real stock price in
levels and di¤erences and the same for real dividends. We included a trend
in the levels regression on the stock price and dividends but excluded it in
the regression of rst di¤erences as well as in the cointegrating regression. An
intercept was always included. The lag length was chosen on the basis of the
Akaike criterion, the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion and the LR-ratio. In most
cases the three criteria agreed on the optimal lag length. Where they didnt
agree all suggested lag lengths have been tried. The results were qualitatively
the same. The eighth line in table 3.1 contains the values of the t-statistics on
the coe¢ cient  in the ADF regression with the corresponding 5% critical values
in line nine.
The results show that both the price series and the dividend series are I(1) in
levels and I(0) in rst di¤erences. Column six indicates that the stock prices and
dividends are not cointegrated at the 5% level. The predictions of the present
12The tests are applied to the levels of all variables. For a logarithmic version including a
time-varying real interest rate see the appendix.
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ADF regression
yt = + t+ yt 1 +
nP
i=1
iyt i + t
Ho :  = 0, unit root in yt
T = 224
yt Pt Pt Dt Dt
 
Pt
Dt

 = 0  = 0  = 0
no of lags 4 3 5 5 3
t-statistic on   1:107  10:864 0:973  8:558  2:207
5% critical value  3:423  2:876  3:423  2:876  3:380
Table 3.1: ADF unit root and cointegration tests on the real stock price and
dividends
value model in (3.1) are clearly conrmed, while (3.2) is rejected. The main
result to take away is that the test clearly rejects the prediction that a bubble
should be explosive. Moreover, the results indicate that the unobservable ut is
not I(0) in levels but more likely to be I(1). This means that there is quite
likely an unobserved variable rather than an explosive bubble component that
inuences stock prices.
To further investigate the possibility of an explosive bubble component in
stock prices we employ another test which has been proposed by Bhargava
(1986). Next to a test statistic for the null hypothesis of a unit root versus
stationarity he provides a direct test of the null of a unit root against an ex-
plosive alternative. The test for the null of a simple random walk against the
stationary alternative is based on the statistic
R1 =
TP
t=2
(yt   yt 1)2
TP
t=1
(yt   y)2
where y is the sample average. One rejects the null of a random walk in favour of
stationarity in yt if R1 becomes larger than some critical value. This is intuitive
because the denominator of R1 grows much faster for a non-stationary series
than for a stationary one. The test for the null of a simple random walk against
the explosive alternative is based on the statistic
N1 =
TP
t=2
(yt   yt 1)2
TP
t=2
(yt   y1)2
One rejects the null of a random walk in favour of the explosive alternative in
yt if N1 becomes smaller than some critical value. Intuitively, this is because for
an explosive series the denominator of N1 grows much faster than for a simple
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random walk. R2 and N2 work similarly for the null of a random walk with drift.
Bhargava test for stationarity
Ho : yt is random walk
H1 : yt is stationary
T = 224
yt
Pt
(Pt)
Dt
(Dt)
Residuals
from
cointegrating
regression
(residuals)
Bhargava test statistic
R2 = 0:0217
(R2 = 1:1654
)
R2 = 0:0140
(R2 = 0:8647
)
R1 = 0:0170
(R1 = 1:3000
)
5% critical value 0:1597 0:1597 0:1194
Table 3.2: Bhargava tests for stationarity on the real stock price, dividends and
cointegration residuals.
Notes: Values for rst di¤erences in parentheses. Asterisks denote rejection of
the null. Test statistic must exceed critical value.
Bhargava test for explosive roots
Ho : yt is random walk
H1 : yt is explosive
T = 224
yt Pt Dt
Residuals
from
cointegrating
regression
Bhargava test statistic N2 = 0:0168 N2 = 0:0128 N1 = 0:0120
5% critical value 0:0097 0:0097 0:0027
Table 3.3: Bhargava tests for explosive roots on the real stock price, dividends
and cointegration residuals.
Notes: Asterisks denote rejection of the null. Test statistics must be lower than
critical value.
Bhargava (1986) tabulates critical values, however only up to a sample size
of 100. Since our sample size in this case is 224 we calculated the corresponding
5% critical value by Monte Carlo simulations13. In table 3.2 the null hypothesis
is that a variable follows a random walk against the stationary alternative. The
null is rejected for test statistics exceeding their critical value. In our case we
cant reject the null of a random walk for the stock price, dividends and the
residuals from the cointegrating regression. This supports the view that the
failure of stock prices and dividends to cointegrate is due to some unobserved
I(1) variable rather than an explosive rational bubble.
13The simulations were cross-checked by rst replicating those critical values tabulated by
Bhargava (1986). Simulations were carried out running 100000 replications.
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Table 3.3 presents results for tests of the null of a random walk against the
explosive alternative. The null is rejected for test statistics below the critical
value. In this case the null of a random walk cant be rejected for the stock
price, the dividend series and the residual.
Overall, the tests conrm the absence of rational explosive bubbles in stock
prices, while at the same time indicating the presence of some unobserved vari-
able that follows a random walk. However, what the test doesnt provide infor-
mation about is at what times the unobserved variable had an impact on stock
prices and whether this inuence was economically and statistically signicant.
Moreover, there is another important caveat about using unit root and coin-
tegration tests to identify rational explosive bubbles that was put forward by
Evans (1991). He has shown the theoretical possibility of periodically collaps-
ing bubbles. Rational bubbles would then only appear explosive during their
expansion, while the subsequent collapse could make the bubble look like an
I(1) variable or stationary. This would mean that tests based on random walk
and cointegrating properties wouldnt detect a bubble since they focus on the
explosive characteristic.
Summing up, the unit root/cointegration approach has two shortcomings.
First, while it conrmes the presence of some unobserved variable in U.S. stock
prices, rational bubbles can be periodically collapsing and might therefore appear
to be integrated of order one instead of explosive as theory suggests (Evans,
1991). Thus, periodically collapsing bubbles cannot be ruled out. Second, it
doesnt provide any information about the level or signicance of the bubble at
di¤erent points in time. We are especially interested whether there was a bubble
in the late 1990s. Thus to further investigate the presence of bubbles we cast
the present value model in a state-space representation and employ the Kalman
ltering technique to get an actual estimate of the size and signicance of the
bubble.
3.6 Estimation of a state-space model
In the previous section it has been argued that pure unit root and cointegration
tests are unable to identify periodically collapsing bubbles. The state-space
model is better suited to nd a possible bubble. It uses the Kalman ltering
technique to arrive at an actual time-series estimate of a possible bubble, i.e.
it can provide information about the size and signicance of a possible bubble.
This estimate can then be used to test for determinants. Further advantages
of the state-space approach are that it is readily applied to the present value
model, it is intuitive and computationally feasible.
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3.6.1 The present value model in state-space representa-
tion
Next, we formulate the present value model in its logarithmic version to t it
into a state-space representation. Consider again the stock price
Pt =
Et (Pt+1 +Dt)
1 +Rt
where Pt is the beginning of period stock price, Dt is the dividend paid during
period t, Rt is the return on the stock from period t to t + 1 and Et is the
expectation at time t. Note that we dont explicitly include an unobserved
variable, leaving its impact to enter the bubble term. Rearranging and taking
logarithms yields
rt = Etpt+1   pt + ln(1 + eEt(dt pt+1))
where lower case letters denote logarithms of upper case letters and rt = ln(1 +
Rt): Taking a rst-order Taylor expansion around xt = Et(dt   pt+1) yields
rt = k + (1   )Etdt +  Etpt+1   pt
where  = 1
1+ed p
and k =   ln +(1  ) ln( 1
 
  1). Rearranging and iterating
forward results in
pt =
k
1   + (1   )Et
1X
i=0
 idt+i   Et
1X
i=0
 irt+i + bt (3.3)
with
Et(bt+i) =

1
 
i
bt (3.4)
First di¤erence these equations to get
pt = (1   )
1X
i=0
 i [Etdt+i   Et 1dt+i 1] 
1X
i=0
 i [Etrt+i   Et 1rt+i 1] + bt
(3.5)
bt =

1
 

bt 1 (3.6)
In case of a constant real interest rate r (3.3) reduces to
pt =
k   r
1   + (1   )Et
1X
i=0
 idt+i + bt
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and (3.5) to
pt = (1   )
1X
i=0
 i [Etdt+i   Et 1dt+i 1] + bt (3.7)
In the following we sketch the principles of the state-space approach and its
estimation14. We then apply it to the present value model. The state-space
model consists of the system of equations:
yt
(n1)
= Axt
(nk)(k1)
+ Hst
(nr)(r1)
+ wt
(n1)
(3.8)
st+1
(r1)
= Fst
(rr)(r1)
+ vt+1
(r1)
(3.9)
(3.8) is the measurement or observation equation, which describes the relation
between observed and unobserved variables, where yt, and xt are vectors of
observed variables and st is a vector of unobserved variables and wt is an error
term. (3.9) is the state equation, which describes the dynamics of the unobserved
variables vector st, where vt+1 is an error term. A, H and F are coe¢ cient
matrices that have to be estimated from the data. Maintained assumptions are
E (vtv
0
 ) =
(
Q for t = 
0 otherwise
E (wtw
0
 ) =
(
R for t = 
0 otherwise
E (vtw
0
 ) = 0 for all t and 
E (vts
0
1) = 0 for all t
E (wts
0
1) = 0 for all t
The objective of the Kalman lter is to nd linear least squares forecasts of the
state vector st: Suppose the coe¢ cient matrices were known, then
s^t+1jt = E^ (st+1 j yt; yt 1; :::; y1; xt; xt 1; :::; x1) (3.10)
= FE^ (st j yt; yt 1; :::; y1; xt; xt 1; :::; x1)
= F s^tjt
14For a thorough discussion refer to Hamiltons (1994) textbook.
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s^tjt is the forecast s^tjt 1 updated by new information in yt.
s^tjt = s^tjt 1 +
n
E
h 
st   s^tjt 1
  
yt   y^tjt 1
0io

n
E
h 
yt   y^tjt 1
  
yt   y^tjt 1
0io 1   yt   y^tjt 1
Updating the forecast is done by adding to it the unanticipated part of the
new piece of information yt   y^tjt 1 weighted by a matrix, which could be inter-
preted as the correlation of the state and measurement equation forecast error.
The larger the correlation the more weighs the arrival of new information. To
compute the updated forecast one needs a forecast of yt.
y^tjt 1 = E^ (yt j yt 1; yt 2; :::; y1; xt; xt 1; :::; x1) (3.11)
= Axt +Hs^tjt 1
The Kalman lter is started by setting starting values for s1j0 and an associated
mean squared error
P1j0 = E

[s1   E (s1)] [s1   E (s1)]0
	
For stationary processes s1j0 is set to the unconditial mean of the process and
the initial mean squared error can be computed from the matrices F and Q.
For non-stationary processes s1j0 is set to some best guess and P1j0 arbitrarily
high to reect the uncertainty about s1j0. Iterate over (3.10) to (3.11) to nd
the series

s^tjt 1
	T
t=1
and

Ptjt 1
	T
t=1
:
The system (3.8) and (3.9) is estimated by maximising the loglikelihood
function
TX
t=1
log f (yt j yt 1; :::; y1; xt; xt 1; :::; x1)
To do so, set the matrices A, H, F , Q, R to some initial values, nd the series
s^tjt 1
	T
t=1
and

Ptjt 1
	T
t=1
by the Kalman lter and calculate the value of the
loglikelihood function. Numerical optimisation procedures can be employed to
maximise the loglikelihood function.
We follow Wu (1997) and estimate a state-space system with the stock price
equation (3.7) as measurement equation and the unobserved bubble process (3.4)
as state equation. The di¤erence to Wu (1997) at this point is that while he
uses data up to 1992 we extend the sample range up to 2005. Also we esti-
mate a version of the model with a time-varying interest rate, while Wu (1997)
assumes a constant real interest rate throughout. The stock price equation is
rst-di¤erenced because the stock price and dividends series are non-stationary.
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Indeed, log dividends are found to follow an ARIMA (h; 1; 0) process15
dt = +
hX
i=1
'idt i + t (3.12)
where the lag length h is determined by the data. (3.12) can be written in the
companion form
zt = u+Bzt 1 + t (3.13)
where zt = (dt;dt 1; :::;dt h+1)
0, u = (; 0; :::; 0)0 and t = (t; 0; :::; 0)
0 are
h-vectors and
B =
0BBBBBBB@
'1 '2 ::: 'h 1 'h
1 0 ::: 0 0
0 1 ::: 0 0
...
. . .
...
0 0 ::: 1 0
1CCCCCCCA
is a hh-matrix. According to Wu (1997) and Campbell and Shiller (1987) the
solution to (3.7) can then be obtained using (3.13) in
pt = dt +Mzt +bt
where M = gB (I  B) 1 I   (1   ) (I    B) 1 and g = (1; 0; :::; 0) are
h-row vectors and I the h h-identity matrix.
3.6.2 Empirical results
In our case to determine the optimal lag length h of the rst di¤erences of
dividends we used the AIC and SBC criteria as well as an LR-ratio test. The
resulting optimal lag length is h = 6 as reported in table 3.10. Together with
(3.6) this implies the following state-space model
pt =
6X
i=0
idt i +bt (3.14)
bt = bt 1 + t (3.15)
Table 3.4 reports the estimation results of the parameters i and  together with
their standard errors and signicance levels. Initial values for the coe¢ cients
were taken from a simple OLS regression of the measurement equation.
Clearly all coe¢ cients except those on the lag of the rst di¤erence of the
bubble term are insignicant. The coe¢ cient on the lagged di¤erence of the
bubble term is signicant. Also the estimated standard deviation of the state
15For all variables the time-series processes have been estimated.
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coe¢ cient std. error prob.
dt 0:1865 0:3647 0:6090
dt 1 0:1783 0:2817 0:5268
dt 2  0:2329 0:3073 0:4486
dt 3  0:1618 0:3077 0:5990
dt 4  0:1034 0:3253 0:7505
dt 5 0:3613 0:2815 0:1993
dt 6 0:2268 0:3183 0:4760
bt 1 0:3634 0:0701 0:0000
 0:0553 0:0020 0:0000
Table 3.4: Estimation results of coe¢ cients in stock price and bubble equation,
constant real interest rate
equation is signicant. Figure 3.2 shows the estimated bubble in levels with
the corresponding 95%-condence bands16. A unit root test on the estimated
-0.5
0.0
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2.5
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smoothed state variable 95% confidence band
Figure 3.2: Smoothed estimate of state variable in levels with 95%-condence
bands, constant real interest rate
state variable is not easily performed since it would be based on estimated data,
16We report results based on smoothed estimates of the state equation in levels, which
means that in (3.10) the Kalman lter uses all available observations t = 1; :::; T to estimate
the unobserved state
s^t+1jT = E^ (st+1 j yT ; yT 1; :::; yt; :::; y1; xT ; xT 1; :::; xt; :::; x1) (3.16)
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such that the critical value normally applied to unit root tests might not be
valid. However, from visual inspection the smoothed state variable appears to
be rather in line with the notion of periodically collapsing bubbles, which would
make the bubble term appear integrated of order one or zero, rather than with
explosive behaviour. There are clearly periods in which the estimated bubble
term is positive and signicant, e.g. during most of the late 1950s through the
early 1970s and especially in the late 1990s. Table 3.5 reports the periods during
which the estimated state variable series is signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Period Sign of state variable
1955 Q2 - 1956 Q3 +
1958 Q3 - 1974 Q1 +
1975 Q4 - 1976 Q3 +
1985 Q2 - 2005 Q4 +
Table 3.5: Signicant bubble episodes, constant real interest rate
Getting a precise estimate for the size of the bubble requires an assumption
about the size of the bubble at the starting date. Conservatively we have set
this starting value to zero in the estimation17. Even with this assumption the
bubble is signicant during plausible periods. However, even without the exact
size of the bubble we can test determinants that might have inuenced the
bubble. Obviously the assumption of a constant real interest rate might be
quite restrictive and responsible for the high stock price index. Therefore we
next estimate the same model as above including a time-varying interest rate.
In particular, we use the following specication.
pt =
6X
i=0
idt i +
7X
j=0
jrt j +bt (3.17)
bt = bt 1 + t (3.18)
The lag length of the real interest rate series is taken from table 3.10 as before
and is also based on the AIC, SBC and LR-ratio. Table 3.6 reports the results.
The coe¢ cients on the contemporaneous values and most of the lags of the rst
di¤erences of dividends and the real interest rate are insignicant. However, only
those on the fth lag of dividends and the third lag of the real interest rate are
signicant. Also the coe¢ cient on the lagged di¤erenced state variable and its
standard deviation are signicant again. Figure 3.3 plots the smoothed estimate
of the level of the state variable. The starting value of the state variable was
set to zero as before. Table 3.7 reports the periods during which the estimated
17Theoretically, a rational bubble can only start at the rst day of trading (Diba and Gross-
man, 1988b). Thus, we also ran the estimation setting the starting value of the state value to
a very small number with the same results.
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coe¢ cient std. error prob.
dt 0:2660 0:3894 0:4946
dt 1 0:2553 0:3474 0:4625
dt 2  0:3464 0:3319 0:2967
dt 3  0:4516 0:3573 0:2062
dt 4  0:0444 0:3173 0:8887
dt 5 0:5078 0:2853 0:0751
dt 6 0:2910 0:3848 0:4495
rt 0:9835 0:6881 0:1529
rt 1  0:4535 0:5459 0:4062
rt 2  0:2192 0:5635 0:6973
rt 3 0:7661 0:4373 0:0798
rt 4  0:8610 0:6643 0:1949
rt 5  0:0009 0:5857 0:9988
rt 6  0:3782 0:6202 0:5420
rt 7 0:8848 0:7041 0:2089
bt 1 0:3372 0:0772 0:0000
 0:0537 0:0024 0:0000
Table 3.6: Estimation results of coe¢ cients in stock price and bubble equation,
time-varying real interest rate
state variable series is signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Period Sign of state variable
1964 Q3 - 1965 Q4 +
1968 Q2 - 1969 Q1 +
1972 Q3 - 1972 Q4 +
1987 Q2 +
1991 Q1 +
1991 Q4 - 2005 Q4 +
Table 3.7: Signicant bubble episodes, time-varying real interest rate
Including a time-varying interest rate eliminates the bubble in the 1950s, in
most of the 1960s and 70s and some of the bubble in the early 1990s. Still, the
level of the S&P 500 just before the Black Monday stock market crash is found
to contain a bubble. From this one can conclude that a time-varying interest
rate is non-negligible in explaining real stock prices.
Another issue that arises when estimating the state variable process is the
construction of the condence intervals. Generally, when making a forecast
based on estimated processes there are two sources of uncertainty, which should
be reected in the standard errors: the forecast uncertainty and the estimation
uncertainty. Lütkepohl (2004) argues that in large samples the estimation un-
certainty becomes negligible. In the present case, for T = 200 and T = 218,
respectively, this means that one can use the residuals from the estimated state
equation to compute the condence bands. However, Lütkepohl (2005) also de-
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Figure 3.3: Smoothed estimate of state variable in levels with 95%-condence
bands, time-varying real interest rate
rives an approximation of the estimation uncertainty in small samples. As a
robustness check, we derive condence intervals for the state variable including
an approximate estimation error in the appendix.
To sum up, the estimation of an unobserved variable which inuences stock
prices over and above dividends yields a statistically signicant coe¢ cient on the
lagged di¤erenced bubble component in the present value model. In addition
the state-space framework delivers estimates for the process of the level of the
unobserved variable over the sample period. It also provides information about
the periods during which the unobserved variable signicantly deviates from
zero. Consequently we can show that there is a substantial deviation of the
unobserved variable from zero during the suspected bubble period in the late
1990s. In what follows we use the estimated process for the unobserved variable
to test a number of variables for their explanatory power. These variables are
proxies for moral hazard behaviour of investors.
56
U.S. stock prices and moral hazard
3.7 Indicators of moral hazard behaviour of in-
vestors
The main problem with analysing the empirical content of the Greenspan-put
hypothesis is that moral hazard behaviour of investors is not observed. We
choose the second best option and rely on theory to nd indicators. In particular,
we construct measures of moral hazard behaviour based on the models by Illing
(2001) and Miller, Weller and Zhang (2002).
3.7.1 The probability of a stock market crash
Illing (2001) sets up a model in which the central bank wants to avoid disruption
of the nancial sector because this leads to a loss of informational capital and
the ine¢ cient liquidation of solvent rms. There is one safe old economy sector
and one risky new economy sector. In case of an aggregate shock to the new
economy sector a share  of failing rms can be restructured with continuation
value C, the share (1   ) is liquidated early at the liquidation value L. Due
to their informational capital it is only the relationship lender bank that knows
which rms are worth being restructured and continued. An aggregate shock
might lead to nancial disruption if it triggers a bank run. Then aggregate losses
would equal (C   L). A bank run occurs if aggregate debt exposure is larger
than what can be recovered in case of an aggregate shock. To avoid any risk
of a bank run and the subsequent nancial disruption, the central bank must
inject enough liquidity to reduce the real value of debt. The value of real debt
must equal the liquidation value of rms. The reduced real debt burden is a
capital gain to the restructured rms in the new economy sector because their
continuation value C is now larger than their real debt burden, which equals L.
If rational investors anticipate these capital gains they include it in the valuation
of the new economy rms driving up their asset price over the fundamental value
by the amount of the expected capital gain. The di¤erence equals the asset price
bubble Bt.
Bt = tt(Ct   Lt)
where t is the probability of an aggregate shock. The asset price bubble depends
positively on the probability of an aggregate shock, the share of restructured
rms and the e¢ ciency loss avoided. We use the probability of an aggregated
shock to test for moral hazard among investors. In our case t is the probability
of a stock market crash. To measure it we rely on a survey among institutional
investors in the U.S. by Robert Shiller. In his Crash Condence Index he reports
the percentage of respondents who think that the probability of a stock market
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crash in the following six months is less than 10%18.
3.7.2 A minimum level of dividends
A second measure has been constructed from a theoretical model by Miller,
Weller and Zhang (2002). They set up a continuous time model of stock prices
where dividends follow a Brownian motion. The source of stock price movements
over and above dividend growth are jumps in the dividend process, which are
interpreted as "periodic large adverse movements which we shall term crises"
(Miller, Weller and Zhang, 2002). These jumps raise the risk-premium and thus
lower the stock price. However, if the central eliminates the downward jumps by
providing su¢ cient liquidity when a fall in dividends is likely to occur, the risk-
premium falls and the stock price rises. Under the assumption that investors
believe that the central bank will prevent dividends from falling sharply and
under various scenarios of parameter values for the real interest rate, the risk-
premium, the dividend growth rate etc. Miller, Weller and Zhang (2002) can
generate quite large stock price overvaluations of up to 204%. They assume that
investors believe that the central bank will stabilise the market at some fraction
 of the latest stock market peak P . More precisely, dividends are prevented
from falling below the minimum level Db which is given by
P (Db) =  P
The current dividend level can be expressed as a multiple of the minimum level,
D = m Db. The stock price bubble B then depends negatively on the ratio m
because the put option given by the central bank is worth more the closer actual
dividends get to the exercise value Db.
B = B(m)
 
As a measure ofm we use the ratio of actual dividends to their level in the period
after the stock price crash 1987 Q419. This takes account of the argument that
the Fed created the expecetation of a bail-out guarantee by its reaction to the
18Survey data on investors stock market condence has been collected since 1984 by
Robert Shiller within the Investor Behavior Project at the Yale International Center for
Finance. The questionnaire has been sent to a number of U.S. investors who have been
sampled from the investment managers section of the Money Market Directory of Pension
Funds and Their Investment Managers. The average sample size in each survey round has
been about a hundred. From the data several indices relating to di¤erent aspects of stock
market condence are constructed, among them the percentage of respondents who think
that the probability of a stock market crash in the following six months is less than 10%.
More on the methodology of Shillers stock market crash condence index can be found on
http://icf.som.yale.edu/condence.index/CrashIndex.shtml.
19 = 0:79 as determined by the data.
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Black Monday stock market crash. In addition, since the same is said to be
true of the LTCM crisis in 1998, we construct an alternative measure of m by
letting the stock price in 1998 Q2 set a new peak, at 79% of which the Fed was
supposed to intervene.
3.7.3 The degree of debt exposure
In addition we use the argument that a central banks incentive to intervene in
a stock market crisis rises with the degree of leverage. Illing (2001) argues that
with higher leverage, i.e. the debt-gdp-ratio, the risk of a bank run and of a
nancial crisis rises, which in turn should lead to the build up of a bubble. Borio
and Lowe (2002) present evidence in an explorative study that the deviation of
the debt-gdp-ratio from its trend and the real credit growth are reasonably good
predictors of nancial crises. We are aware that this measure is rather weak
because there might be a simultaneity problem. High credit growth might be
caused by high asset price growth and vice versa. We try to avoid this problem
by including only lagged values of credit growth and its deviation from trend in
the tests.
3.7.4 Empirical results
There are ve di¤erent indicators of moral hazard behaviour derived from the
theoretical models discussed above: The probability of a stock market crash,
two versions of the ratio of current dividends to a minimum level as perceived
to be guaranteed by the central bank, the deviation of the debt-gdp-ratio from
trend and the growth of real debt outstanding. The indicators were tested in
two ways. First, we checked whether each indicator, appropriately di¤erenced
and lagged, had a signicant impact on the residuals from the state equation in
levels.
^t =
nX
i=0
ixt i + !t (3.19)
where ^ are the tted residuals from the state equation in levels, xt is one of
the di¤erent moral hazard indicators and ! is an error term. The lag length n
is determined by the data. Unless an indicator follows an AR(1) process itself
any signicant inuence on the bubble should show up in this test. Second, we
included each indicator in turn in the measurement equation.
pt =
6X
i=0
idt i +
7X
j=0
jrt j +
nX
i=0
ixt i +bt (3.20)
If moral hazard behaviour had any impact on stock prices the coe¢ cients i of
the indicator should be signicant. One could view this specication as allowing
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for the part of a time-varying risk-premium, which is assumed to be inuenced
by the degree of moral hazard. A specication analysis of the time-series of
the indicators on the basis of unit root tests, the AIC criterion and tests for
autocorrelation was performed. We used the logs of the rst three indicators
because of the logarithmic formulation of our baseline estimation. The last two
indicators are already in growth rates and deviation from trend, respectively.
All indicators start in 1987 Q4 the period after the Black Monday stock market
crash.
To make the di¤erent approaches in this paper consistent we based them all
on the same dataset. It is well known that unit root tests are quite sensitive
to the sample length, which is why we opted for the maximum length available.
However, these data are only available as monthly averages. As Working (1960)
has pointed out the use of averages might result in autocorrelation of the se-
ries in rst di¤erences when in fact the series in levels follows a random walk.
Unfortunately this proposition cant be tested on the data we used because non-
averaged data is not available for the maximum sample length. However, the
results based on averaged data yields plausible estimates for potential deviations
of stock prices from their fundamentals as specied by the present value model.
This is further supported by the results from the unit root/cointegration analy-
sis, which cannot reject the presence of an unobservable variable that follows
a stochastic trend. Furthermore, the tests for the impact of the various moral
hazard indicators in the augmented measurement equation serve as a cross-check
for the results derived from the state equation. Thus, even if the autocorrelation
in the state equation was induced by the use of averaged data, the indicators
should still be signicant in the measurement equation. A non-signicant coef-
cient in the state equation could result because the lter might not detect any
unobservable variable that doesnt exactly follow an AR(1) process, which the
various indicators dont. After all the analysis is not intended as a test for the
existence of bubbles per se but rather as a test for the impact of measures of
moral hazard on stock prices.
Table 3.8 reports the results for the rst test. The only indicator with a sig-
nicance level of below 10% is the contemporaneous ratio of current dividends
to a minimum level in the test for misspecication of the state equation. Note
however, that the coe¢ cient is positive, contrary to what Miller, Weller and
Zhangs (2002) model predicts. The results across all other indicators clearly
reject the Greenspan-put hypothesis. None of the other indicators has a signi-
cant impact on the residuals from the state equation. Furthermore, only the rst
lag of the growth rate of debt-to-gdp in the augmented measurement equation is
marginally signicant on the 10%-level with the correct sign. None of the other
indicators has any signicant impact on the log-di¤erenced stock price in the
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Test for misspecication of state equation (3.19)
^t =
nP
i=0
ixt i + !t
time-varying real interest rate
indicator xt i no. lags lag i coe¢ cient std. error prob.
 ln t i 0 0  0:0068 0:0147 0:6427
 lnm1987t i 4 0 0:8815 0:5089 0:0881
1  0:1229 0:5484 0:8234
2 0:5438 0:5315 0:3101
3 0:1305 0:5411 0:8102
4  0:6353 0:5113 0:2186
 lnm1998t i 2 0 0:0485 0:2043 0:8130
1 0:1477 0:2030 0:4693
2 0:2038 0:2033 0:3198
Debt
GDP
gapt i 3 1  0:4430 0:8495 0:6026
2  0:5878 0:9999 0:5573
3 0:9538 0:8265 0:2499
Debt
GDP
growtht i 6 1  0:7731 1:5036 0:6077
2 1:9447 1:6951 0:2527
3 0:7100 1:7621 0:6875
4 0:4953 1:7387 0:7761
5  0:8890 1:6286 0:5858
6  1:0082 1:4221 0:4792
Table 3.8: Impact of moral hazard indicators on residuals from state equation
in levels
measurement equation as table 3.9 shows.
Altogether this suggests at a minimum that the predictions of the models
by Illing (2001) and Miller, Weller and Zhang (2002) are not conrmed by the
data. Under the assumption that the indicators are valid measures of moral
hazard behaviour of investors, the results also indicate a clear rejection of the
Greenspan-put hypothesis.
3.8 Conclusion
The research objective of this paper is to investigate the empirical content of the
Greenspan-put hypothesis. It claims that investors believed in an implicit bail-
out guarantee by the Fed should the stock market crash. The Fed is believed to
inject liquidity into the market in a stock market crash as it has done a number of
times in the past and as Greenspan (2004) claims to have done. This is supposed
to have contributed to the build-up of the bubble in the late 1990s. Using the
present value model of stock prices we have identied an unobserved variable
which is integrated of order one as a determinant of stock prices from 1950 to
2005. Since periodically collapsing bubbles might appear integrated of order one
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Augmented stock price equation (3.20)
pt =
6P
i=0
idt i +
7P
j=0
jrt j +
nP
i=0
ixt i +bt
indicator xt i no. lags lag i coe¢ cient std. error prob.
 ln t i 0 0 0:0068 0:0409 0:8674
 lnm1987t i 4 0  0:2324 0:7461 0:7554
1 0:8337 0:9330 0:3715
2 1:2449 0:9990 0:2127
3  0:4265 0:8995 0:6354
4 0:6810 0:7932 0:3906
 lnm1998t i 2 0 0:0134 0:3217 0:9667
1  0:1351 0:1847 0:4644
2 0:1152 0:1889 0:5420
Debt
GDP
gapt i 3 1  0:7011 0:9852 0:4767
2 0:2336 1:2268 0:8490
3  0:0216 1:0972 0:9843
Debt
GDP
growtht i 6 1 2:8048 1:7313 0:1052
2  1:0509 2:2883 0:6461
3  1:4858 1:8944 0:4329
4 1:1092 2:4762 0:6542
5 0:3422 2:0680 0:8686
6  0:6819 1:8624 0:7143
Table 3.9: Impact of moral hazard indicators on stock prices in measurement
equation
or zero (Evans, 1991) we have estimated a state-space model and have identied
periods of signicant estimates of the unobserved time-series component which
we take as a bubble. One is during the 1960s and the early 1970s and the
other one in the late 1990s. This allows to test for various measures of moral
hazard behaviour of investors. These measures are constructed on the basis of
theoretical models because moral hazard itself is not observable. Our results
show that none of the moral hazard indicators has any explanatory power in
either the bubble process itself or the stock price equation. The bubble in the
late 1990s cant be explained by measures of moral hazard. However, we nd
that a large part of the bubble can be explained by time variations in the real
interest rate.
One criticism of our approach might be that the measures of moral hazard are
false. However, the measures are based on theory and thus, at a minimum, we are
able to reject the predictions of the models by Illing (2001) and Miller, Weller
and Zhang (2002). Moreover, there is the so-called Peso problem: Rational
expectations of some event, like a future tax cut, might have pushed up stock
prices, even though the expected event didnt materialize later on. Since these
expectations are not observed and it is very hard to nd a measure based on
theory, we cant control for them. Finally, it may be possible that moral hazard
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considerations weigh more in more narrow stock market indices than the S&P
500. Applying the approach laid out in this paper to other indices might yield
further insights. All in all we are unable to conrm the hypothesis that there
existed the wide-spread belief in a Greenspan put option as tested on the S&P
500 stock index. This suggests either that U.S. investors truly didnt believe in
an implicit bail-out guarantee after having observed the Feds rescue operations
in the past, or that currently existing models dont fully capture the moral
hazard element and further research in that area is needed.
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Appendix 3.A Unit root and cointegration tests
with a time-varying interest rate
ADF regression in log-levels
yt = + t+ yt 1 +
nP
i=1
iyt i + t
Ho :  = 0, unit root in yt
T = 224 for pt and dt, T = 207 for rt
yt pt pt dt dt rt rt
 
pt
dt

 = 0  = 0  = 0  = 0  = 0
no of lags 2 1 7 6 7 7 2
t-statistic on   0:986  13:717  1:957  8:871  0:718  9:897  2:652
5% critical value  3:423  2:876  3:423  2:876  2:876  2:876  3:380
Table 3.10: ADF unit root and cointegration tests on the natural logarithm of
the real stock price, dividends and the real interest rate
Table 3.10 presents the results for unit root tests on the present value model with
a time-varying interest rate using the S&P 500 dividend index series. The fact
that the real interest rate seems integrated of order 1 in table 3.10 is probably
due to a structural break at the beginning of the 1980s when ination fell sharply
due to Paul Volckers tight monetary policy and the real interest rate soared.
For the purpose of our analysis we disregard formally accounting for a structural
break in the unit root tests because our conclusions dont depend on it. However,
a Chow breakpoint and Chow forecast test rejects the null of no structural break
for 1981 Q1.
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coe¢ cient std. error prob.
dt 0:3012 0:1331 0:0237
dt 1 0:1622 0:1780 0:3621
dt 2  0:1605 0:1813 0:3760
dt 3  0:0598 0:1902 0:7533
dt 4  0:0441 0:1562 0:7776
dt 5 0:1144 0:1847 0:5357
bt 1 0:3534 0:0640 0:0000
 0:0546 0:0019 0:0000
Table 3.11: Estimation results of coe¢ cients in stock price and bubble equation,
constant real interest rate, alternative dividend measure
Appendix 3.B Empirical results for the alter-
native dividend measure
This section presents the central results of the analysis using the alternative
dividend series, U.S. net corporate dividend payments. It is seasonally adjusted.
However, it contains more than the dividend payments on the S&P 500. We
estimate
pt =
5X
i=0
idt i +bt (3.21)
bt = bt 1 + t (3.22)
for a constant real interest rate and
pt =
5X
i=0
idt i +
7X
j=0
jrt j +bt (3.23)
bt = bt 1 + t (3.24)
for a time-varying real interest rate. Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show the estimation
results of the state space model with and without a time-varying interest rate.
The real interest rate is not signicant in the estimation of stock prices; the
coe¢ cient on the lagged state variable, however, is signicant. Tables 3.13 and
3.14 report the test results for the impact of the moral hazard indicators on the
residuals of the state equation in levels and on the stock price in the measurement
equation, respectively.
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coe¢ cient std. error prob.
dt 0:3388 0:1645 0:0395
dt 1 0:1409 0:2217 0:5249
dt 2  0:1634 0:2757 0:5534
dt 3  0:0653 0:2089 0:7547
dt 4  0:0486 0:1965 0:8046
dt 5 0:2057 0:2312 0:3736
rt 0:8641 0:6653 0:1940
rt 1  0:4584 0:5447 0:4000
rt 2  0:3769 0:6006 0:5304
rt 3 0:5318 0:4459 0:2330
rt 4  0:9838 0:6894 0:1536
rt 5 0:0970 0:4994 0:8460
rt 6  0:4024 0:5802 0:4880
rt 7 0:7548 0:6413 0:2392
bt 1 0:3388 0:0744 0:0000
 0:0535 0:0025 0:0000
Table 3.12: Estimation results of coe¢ cients in stock price and bubble equation,
time-varying real interest rate, alternative dividend measure
Test for misspecication of state equation
^t =
nP
i=0
ixt i + !t
time-varying real interest rate
indicator xt i no. lags lag i coe¢ cient std. error prob.
 ln t i 0 0  0:0016 0:0147 0:9124
 lnm1987t i 0 0 0:0667 0:1599 0:6771
 lnm1998t i 0 0  0:0668 0:0697 0:3390
Debt
GDP
gapt i 3 1  0:5530 0:8466 0:5144
2  0:4970 0:9965 0:6185
3 0:7257 0:8237 0:3794
Debt
GDP
growtht i 6 1 0:2180 1:5058 0:8850
2 0:5370 1:6976 0:7521
3 0:2072 1:7648 0:9067
4  0:1266 1:7413 0:9421
5 0:6819 1:6311 0:6763
6  1:0691 1:4242 0:4538
Table 3.13: Impact of moral hazard indicators on residuals from state equation
in levels, alternative dividend measure
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Augmented stock price equation
pt =
5P
i=0
idt i +
7P
j=0
jrt j +
nP
i=0
ixt i +bt
indicator xt i no. lags lag i coe¢ cient std. error prob.
 ln t i 0 0  0:0001 0:0413 0:9974
 lnm1987t i 0 0  0:3622 0:3812 0:3421
 lnm1998t i 0 0  0:0709 0:2482 0:7751
Debt
GDP
gapt i 3 1  0:4167 1:0737 0:6979
2 0:2502 1:4529 0:8633
3  0:3448 1:2538 0:7833
Debt
GDP
growtht i 6 1 2:9552 1:7383 0:0891
2  0:3740 2:4246 0:8755
3  1:4031 2:0582 0:4954
4  0:2463 2:5758 0:9238
5 0:0486 2:3060 0:9832
6  0:2078 2:0330 0:9186
Table 3.14: Impact of moral hazard indicators on stock prices in measurement
equation, alternative dividend measure
Appendix 3.C Condence bands for the esti-
mated state variable with approx-
imate estimation uncertainty
Lütkepohl (2005, p. 97) provides an approximation for the mean squared error
(MSE) of the 1-step forecast with an estimated coe¢ cient.
MSE

b^t

=
T + p+ 1
T
MSE () (3.25)
where T is the sample size and p the lag length, in our case p = 1. MSE () are
the mean squared errors from the estimated state equations (3.22) and (3.24),
respectively. For T ! 1, MSE

b^t

! MSE (). This approximation
is derived for stationary processes. We use the more conservative measure of
dividends, net corporate dividends. The results are presented in tables (3.11)
and (3.12). Using Lütkepohls approximation the estimation yields the following
periods, during which there was a signicant change in the bubble term as
presented in tables (3.15) and (3.16).
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Period Sign of state variable
1955 Q3 +
1957 Q4  
1961 Q1 +
1962 Q2  
1970 Q2  
1974 Q3  
1975 Q1 - 1975 Q2 +
1980 Q3 +
1982 Q4 +
1987 Q1 +
1987 Q4  
1997 Q3 +
1999 Q1 +
2002 Q3  
2005 Q4  
Table 3.15: Signicant changes in the bubble term, constant real interest rate,
approximated 95%-condence band
Period Sign of state variable
1957 Q4  
1958 Q4 +
1961 Q1 +
1962 Q2  
1969 Q3  
1970 Q2  
1974 Q2 - 1974 Q4  
1975 Q1 +
1982 Q4 +
1987 Q1 +
1987 Q4  
1999 Q1 +
2002 Q3  
2005 Q4  
Table 3.16: Signicant changes in the bubble term, time-varying real interest
rate, approximated 95%-condence band
The results indicate a number of periods where the bubble grew or shrank
signicantly. In particular, the bubble grew in 1987 Q1 and shrank in 1987 Q4,
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which captures the events around Black Monday. Furthermore, the bubble grew
in 1999 Q1 and shrank in 2002 Q3, which broadly corresponds to the results
derived in section 6.
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Chapter 4
The cyclicality of aggregate bank
lending under bank capital
regulation
4.1 Introduction
One of the most prominent measures of banking regulation is the minimum cap-
ital requirement, which states that a bank has to hold at least a certain fraction
of its risk-weighted assets in equity as a bu¤er against insolvency. It is one of
three core regulatory instruments of the Basel Capital Accord (Basel I), on which
the Group of Ten (G10) countries have agreed and which entered into force in
1988. The other two pillars are an enhanced supervisory process and disclo-
sure requirements about banksrisk proles. Basel I was originally intended for
the G10 countries, but meanwhile it has been incorporated into EU legislation
as an EU capital requirements directive. On top of that a growing number of
additional countries have adopted these rules (Jackson et al., 1999). Under the
Basel Accord the minimum capital requirement is set to 8% and risk-weights are
assigned according to borrower category (sovereign, bank or corporate entity).
This categorisation has been critizised for its incentives for regulatory arbitrage:
It doesnt di¤erentiate between di¤erent degrees of risk among borrowers within
one category. Banks will therefore tend to shift their portfolios towards investing
in the relatively riskier projects within each category. To better align individual
credit risk and the assigned risk-weights the Basel I framework has been revised.
The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), which came into force in 2006, makes
risk-weights contingent on borrower specic ratings. Risk-weights are calculated
using borrowers specic ratings. Two types of ratings are allowed: The standard
approach, where ratings on borrowers are supplied by external rating agencies,
and an internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, where banks are allowed to pro-
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duce their own measure of borrowersriskiness, subject to their method being
approved by the regulator. Under the IRB approach a bank uses its own esti-
mates of key inputs to calculate risk-weights: The probability of default (PD)
of a borrower, the loss given default (LGD), the exposure at default (EAD) and
a maturity adjustment. Disclosure requirements under the New Basel Accord
together with a periodic review of supervisors are aimed at ensuring that banks
apply risk-weights that are consistent with their current business environment1.
Yet many critics have argued that the new framework focuses too much on
capital adequacy at the individual bank level which might lead to increased
volatility of credit supply2 in the aggregate exacerbating the business cycle,
which is often referred to as procyclicality (Danielsson et al., 2001). It is argued
that in a recession all types of loans become riskier and will be assigned a higher
risk weight. This will lead to a fall in the capital adequacy ratio at all banks,
which will then reduce their loan supply assuming that outside capital is di¢ cult
to raise in a recession. In the aggregate this will then lead to a worsening of the
recession if rms have no other means of nancing.
It is necessary to point out that loan supply without any regulation can be
procyclical in itself, i.e. banks grant more loans in a boom than in a reces-
sion. This paper deals with the question whether the introduction of variable
risk-weights under the Basel II Accord will make aggregate lending excessively
procyclical compared to a situation with no capital requirement at all and to
a minimum capital requirement with xed risk-weights (Basel I). While it is
certainly true that an increase in the risk-weights on the loan portfolio of an
individual bank whose capital constraint is binding leads to a reduction in the
banks loan supply, it is not immediately clear what happens in the aggregate
when only a fraction of banks in the economy is constrained. Given the observed
excess capital holdings at many banks it is expected that not all banks will re-
duce lending in response to a given negative macroeconomic shock because their
capital ratios have fallen below the required minimum.
To justify our approach observe from table 4.1 that these large EU banks hold
more capital than the required minimum of 8%, i.e. a capital bu¤er, and that
there is cross-sectional variation in the bu¤ers. Di¤erent banks hold di¤erent
capital ratios. In addition, Jokipii and Milne (2007) report average capital
bu¤ers across European countries ranging from 1:46%-points in the UK to 6:99%-
points in Malta3. Furthermore, Peura and Jokivuolle (2004) report a median of
1For detailed explanations of the review process and the di¤erent methods for calculating
risk-weights see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005, 2006).
2We will use the terms credit supply, loan supply and (bank) lending interchangeably.
3Average values across banks (weighted by market share) in each country from 1997 to 2004.
Capital bu¤ers are total risk-weighted capital less the required minimum in each country (at
least 8%). In most countries these bu¤ers have no or a postive trend.
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the total capital ratio of 11:2% for the US, Europe and Japan4, which is well
above the required 8%.
Ratio of capital to
Bank name risk-weighted assets
Commerzbank, D 12.6
Société Générale, F* 11.7
ABN AMRO Bank, NL 11.3
Barclays, UK 11.5
Deutsche Bank, D 13.6
HVB, D 10.4
Fortis, B 12.3
ING Bank, NL 11.5
Royal Bank of Scotland, UK 11.7
Rabobank Group, NL* 10.9
UBS, CH 13.6
HSBC, UK 12.0
HBOS, UK 11.8
Table 4.1: Capital adequacy ratios of large European banks
Notes: Numbers in percentage points as of 31.12.2004. An asterisk denotes data
as of 31.12.2003. Source: Banksannual reports and www.thebanker.com
The innovation in this paper is to allow for heterogeneity among banks with
regard to their capital holdings and to explicitly model an interbank market,
where banks can lend and borrow to attain their optimal loan supply. The
question is then what happens when the economy faces an increase in aggregate
risk, e.g. due to a downswing or recession, with the associated increase in risk-
weights on all bank loans under Basel II. We measure excess credit volatility by
comparing the response of aggregate lending to a change in macroeconomic risk
with and without a capital constraint. Aggregate loan supply can only uctuate
to the extent that the liability side of the aggregate bank balance sheet uctuates.
In order to focus the analysis on the question whether risk-weights that vary
according to aggregate risk have the capacity to induce excessive uctuations in
aggregate credit over and above the uctuation by bank capital or debt, we hold
the level of bank capital and bank debt constant such that the only source of
cyclicality is changing macro risk5. However, if the liability side of the aggregate
bank balance sheet is unchanged, no uctuation in aggregate credit is possible.
Merely the distribution of lending across di¤erent groups of banks might change.
Therefore to allow for the possibility of aggregate credit uctuation over and
above the uctuation of aggregate bank capital or bank debt one needs to allow
for another asset that can be added or withdrawn from banksbalance sheet. As
4Bank level time-series averages over the period 1997 to 2001.
5An entirely di¤erent line of argument would be based on feedback e¤ects from reduced
lending via reduced repayments on bank debt to again reduced bank capital.
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an example for an additional asset we use interbank loans. We then show that
the procyclicality of aggregate bank lending depends crucially on the elasticity
of supply of and demand for interbank loans, which in turn is reected in the
sensitivity of the interbank rate to a change in supply of and demand for it.
We illustrate this mechanism by looking at an interbank market in which a
central bank is able to withdraw or inject additional funds, thereby controlling
the sensitivity of the interbank rate to changes in supply of and demand for
it. The interest rate on loans to rms is determined by the opportunity and
renancing cost of lending to rms, which in the model is the interbank rate.
If the additional supply of interbank funds by the constrained banks after an
increase in aggregate risk is completely absorbed the interbank rate remains
unchanged. It follows that lending by unconstrained banks doesnt change and
aggregate lending is reduced. In contrast, if the interbank rate falls, opportunity
costs of unconstrained banks fall and their lending increases, thereby o¤setting
partly or fully the reduction in lending by constrained banks.
Our main ndings are that the degree of excess procyclicality depends on the
sensitivity of the interbank rate to a change in aggregate risk, on the sensitivity
of loan supply to rms with regard to a change in the opportunity costs, the
sensitivity of risk-weights to a change in aggregate risk and on the proportion of
constrained banks in the economy after an increase in aggregate risk. Note that
the analysis is purely positive and takes regulation as given while asking what
are the implications for uctuations in aggregate credit.
An important question is whether the observed capital bu¤ers under the
Basel I regime with constant risk-weights can be expected to exist under the New
Basel Accord with variable risk-weights. After all the objective of the reform of
the Basel regulatory framework is to better align regulatory and economic bank
capital. Economic bank capital is in this context the captial ratio a bank would
optimally choose to hold in the absence of regulatory requirements. Regulatory
capital might be the socially optimal level of capital. A nancial safetey net
e.g. might reduce the incentives for an individual bank to hold enough capital.
A minimum capital requirement might be desirable to bring up bankscapital
holdings towards the socially desirable level. Perfectly aligning regulatory and
economic bank capital could mean that there will be no bu¤ers. However, there
are a number of reasons for why banks might nevertheless hold more capital
than required even with variable risk-weights. Banks might hold a capital bu¤er
as nancial slack to be able to exploit unexpected prot opportunities; further-
more, banks might want to insure against nancial distress which might arise
from the consequences of violating the minimum capital requirement and the
subsequent regulatory penalties and associated reputational loss (Berger, Her-
ring and Szegö, 1995). In addition, banks are required to hold more than the
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minimum under the supervisory arrangements of pillar 2 of the New Basel Ac-
cord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). Moreover, Lowe (2002)
argues that the disclosure requirements of pillar 3 of the New Basel Accord are
likely to lead to capital holdings in excess of the required minimum because
a future need to raise additional capital when the capital ratio falls might be
anticipated by capital markets already in good times. In sum, the introduction
of capital requirements itself might change the level of economic capital.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 relates our paper
to the literature, section 3 sets up the model and presents solutions for aggregate
credit supply and its response to a macroeconomic shock with and without the
capital constraint; section 4 assesses the degree of excess procyclicality on the
basis of the model implications, section 5 discusses some features of the model,
and section 6 concludes.
4.2 Related literature
A number of studies have looked at the problem of procyclicality under bank
capital regulation. Allen and Saunders (2004) look at the sources of cyclical
variations in the elementary inputs to calculating risk-weights, however without
working with a model. In addition, Lowe (2002) discusses the inuence of aggre-
gate risk on the measurement of risk-weights and looks at the possible macro-
economic consequences, however also without a formal model. Both papers
come to the conclusion that the proposed methods for calculating risk-weights
under Basel II are indeed likely to lead to cyclical variations in risk-weights.
Furthermore, there are papers that use models to evaluate the e¤ect of a mini-
mum capital requirement on aggregate credit supply. Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson
and Tsomocos (2005) evaluate the likelihood of procyclical credit supply in a
calibrated model with a capital constraint à la Basel II. Their focus is on the
optimal choice of the method to provide internal ratings of borrowers. Specif-
ically, they look at three scenarios of procyclical, countercyclical and constant
borrowersrating quality. They nd that without regulation banks would opt
for a countercyclical rating method, while they would choose the procyclical one
if regulation forbids the countercyclical one. Blum and Hellwig (1995) look at a
macroeconomic model with banks, into which they introduce a capital constraint
with constant risk-weights. They dont consider distributional e¤ects of bank
capital and conclude that bank capital regulation will reinforce the procyclical-
ity of bank lending, investment and therefore output. The source of cyclicality
in their model is cyclical bank capital, which in our model is constant. Also
in their model the constraint is binding either for all banks or for none. Es-
trella (2004) uses a dynamic model of an optimising representative bank, which
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trades o¤ the costs of holding and adjusting capital versus the costs of default
to yield an optimal level of capital holdings. He arrives at the conclusion that
risk-sensitive capital requirements under Basel II might give rise to procyclical
capital requirements and bank lending. Kashyap and Stein (2004) look at the
optimal regulatory capital requirement. The regulator optimises the trade-o¤
between allowing banks to issue loans e¢ ciently and ensuring systemic stability.
As a result they propose state-contingent capital requirements, which decrease
in a downswing. They show in a calibrated model that otherwise there might
be quite large uctuations in credit supply. Hofmann (2005) shows with a cali-
brated model of credit portfolio risk that binding capital constraints increase the
uctuation of credit supply. Our paper di¤ers from those in that we allow banks
to hold more capital than required and that banks hold di¤erent amounts. Sim-
ilarly, Heid (2007) explicitly takes into account the existence of capital bu¤ers.
The reason why the bank holds a capital bu¤er is that the owners might incur
a loss in case of default of the bank, which is larger than the costs of holding
a capital bu¤er. However, his model also uses a representative bank and there
is no interbank market. His conclusion is that capital bu¤ers can mitigate the
extent of procyclicality. Also, Repullo and Suarez (2007) use a representative
bank to evaluate procyclical credit supply. Their conclusion is that although
banks may choose to hold a capital bu¤er a larger contraction of credit supply
in a recession under Basel II than under Basel I is likely.
Tanaka (2001) analyses the e¤ect of bank capital regulation on the monetary
transmission mechanism and nds that on top of making loan supply overly
sensitive to a change in macro risk, it weakens the power of monetary policy
to stimulate the economy when the capital constraint becomes binding. Chen
(2001) shows in a dynamic model that a bank capital requirement together with
a rm collateral requirement produces amplied credit volatility. In Chens
model banks are implicitly capital constraint because with too little capital
banks cant commit to monitoring and cant raise su¢ cient deposits. They
have to reduce lending instead. Goodhart and others have in various studies
(Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano, 2004; Goodhart, 2005) argued that risk-
sensitive bank capital regulation will be more procyclical than with constant
risk-weights. However, in the same studies it is mentioned that banks might want
to hold a capital bu¤er above the required minimum and this might act as an
o¤setting factor. Also, Caruana (2005) argues that enhanced risk-management
systems under pillar 2 will make a bank more forward-looking and thus better
prepared for times of trouble enabling it to react in a timely and adequate fashion
to avoid sharp cuts in credit supply.
Another related branch in the literature deals with the interaction of a min-
imum bank capital requirement and monetary policy (von Peter, 2004; Chami
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and Cosimano, 2001; Zicchino, 2005; Cecchetti and Li, 2005). Overall, how-
ever, these models either look at a representative bank or at the aggregate bank
balance sheet and neglect distributional aspects.
There is also a large strand of the literature that deals with modelling an
interbank market, e.g. Agion, Bolton and Dewatripont (1999), Freixas and Pa-
rigi (1998), Rochet and Tirole (1996), Allen and Gale (2000) or Acharya (2001).
Typically, however, these models are concerned with modelling di¤erent struc-
tures of an interbank market and the implications for systemic risk via domino
e¤ects or contagion. They do not look at the implications for macroeconomic
variables like aggregate lending or output. Similarly, a framework set up by
Eichberger and Summer (2005) looks at mutual credit exposure in the interbank
market and assesses the implications for systemic stability. In what follows we
will start from their framework because it is suitable to incorporate heteroge-
neous banks in a tractable way. We adapt it to look at the implications of
capital adequacy requirements for aggregate loan supply. In their model they
only briey mention that the e¤ects on aggregate lending are unclear. We pro-
vide a detailed analysis of just this point and are able to work out the exact
mechanism by which the distribution and aggregate volume of bank lending is
a¤ected.
4.3 The model
The model builds on the framework of a banking system developed by Eichberger
and Summer (2005). There, rms have a binary investment opportunity of
xed size such that changes in aggregate credit come about indirectly by credit
rationing of rms. In contrast we employ a continuous loan demand function
derived from rm prot maximisation along the lines of Gray and Wu (1995) to
analyse the cyclical behaviour of credit supply.
4.3.1 Loan demand
There is a number of rms in each sector i of the economy, each of which has
access to a neoclassical production technology. Loan demand by rms is derived
from a standard prot maximisation problem. Each rm buys capital at the
price of 1 using a bank loan Li and produces output yi under decreasing marginal
returns to capital using a production function.
yi = sqL

i
where  < 1: Firms in each sector i are distinguished by an individual produc-
tivity parameter q, which is ex-ante unknown to both the rm and the bank. It
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is randomly assigned after receiving the loan and is uniformly distributed over
[0;M ] : Banks o¤er the same interest rate to all rms from one sector since they
cant observe individual productivities when making the loan. s = f0; 1g is an
aggregate shock capturing rmssuccess or failure. If s = 0 there is no output in
any sector and no repayment of any outstanding loan by rms. The probability
that s = 1 is given by
Pr (s = 1) = 
with 0 <  < 1. The higher  the better the state of the economy and the
lower is aggregate risk. The interest rate Ri on bank loans to rms in sector i
is taken as given by each rm. A rm will apply for a loan only if the payo¤
from producing and repaying the loan is positive, given that the aggregate shock
s = 1.
qLi  RiLi  0
where the payo¤ to the outside option is normalized to zero. Dene qas qLi  
RiLi = 0
q = RiL1 i (4.1)
For values of q below q the rm makes a negative prot and defaults on its
credit liabilities while for values above q the rm succeeds and pays back its
loan. The critical value of the productivity shock is higher with a higher interest
rate and with a larger loan size, i.e. a high interest rate or a large loan size make
a default more likely. The expected prot of each rm is then given by
E(firm) = 
MZ
q
(qLi  RiLi)g(q)dq
where g(q) is the probability density function of q. Using the uniform distri-
bution of q, (4.1) and maximising with respect to Li yields the optimal loan
demand, which falls with a higher interest rate.
Ldi =


2  
M
Ri
 1
1 
(4.2)
4.3.2 Optimal loan supply without regulation
4.3.2.1 Individual banks loan supply
We assume that there is one bank in each sector of the economy. Banks are
relationship lenders. Each bank in the economy has an informational advantage
over other banks in lending to its long-term customer rms. Therefore each rm
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belongs to the customer group of exactly one bank and can only borrow from
that bank. As a consequence banks act as monopolists when lending to their
customers. Moreover, since ex-ante all rms are identical from the point of view
of the bank and all rms in one sector depend on one single bank, the index i
also refers to bank i.
In our model risk-neutral banks di¤er in their holdings of capital. Bank
capital ei is assumed to be distributed according to some distribution function,
with density f (ei) and cumulative distribution function F (ei). This might be
because they have di¤erent future prot opportunities as they serve di¤erent
sectors of the economy. When maximising prots they take into account their
discounted value from running a banking business, the charter value (Keeley,
1990; Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000). Thus, banks with a higher charter
value hold a larger capital bu¤er than banks with a lower charter value6.
It is assumed that capital is di¢ cult to raise in the short run such that banks
take it as given in their decision on loan supply. Banks maximise their expected
return from making loans to rms and other banks taking into account interest
payments on deposits, equity and loans taken from the interbank market.
There is another important assumption to make. Firms mustnt be able to
substitute bank nance by other means of nancing (Kashyap and Stein, 1994).
Otherwise investment and production wouldnt depend on bank loan supply.
Each bank has a given amount of deposits d0, which is assumed to be the
same for all banks, and a given amount of equity ei, which varies across banks,
available to make loans to rms. It is assumed that in the short-run bank
equity is x. With a given amount of debt for all banks balance sheets only
di¤er in equity capital. This assumption allows to concentrate entirely on the
impact of variable risk-weights together with di¤erences in capital holding on the
cyclicality of bank lending and implies that in this model well capitalised banks
are those that have a relatively large amount of funds available for lending.
However, it also implies that ceteris paribus there can only be uctutations
in aggregate credit to the extent that the amount of interbank funds in the
system varies7. The bank can lend or borrow in the interbank market at a
competitively determined interbank rate. Following Eichberger and Summer
(2005) we dene l+ = max fli; 0g and l  =  min fli; 0g to denote an interbank
lenders and borrowers position, respectively, where li denotes an interbank
loan. The interbank rate is rI , the return to equity rE and the deposit rate is
normalized to zero.
6Since we have a static model, however, this is not explicitly modelled. For a formal model
refer to Elizalde and Repullo (2007).
7This is one possibility to allow for uctuations of the aggregate bank balance sheet. It
could also be accomplished by any other additional asset that can be added to or withdrawn
from the banking system.
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The payo¤ from investment for bank i is
bank =
MZ
q
siRiLig(q)dq   rEei   rI l i + rI l+i
where  is the discount on the return from interbank loans that is due to some
banks defaulting on their interbank loans8. Note that in this framework inter-
bank loans are assumed to be settled via a central clearing house without any
direct bilateral exposure among banks. The aggregate shock si introduces the
possibility for banks to go bankrupt. Bank is expected payo¤ is given by
E(bank) = 
MZ
q
RiLig(q)dq   rEei   rI l i + rI l+i
where  is the expected discount on the interbank return due to defaults. To
produce a benchmark case to which we can compare the solution with the capital
constraint we rst derive the optimal loan supply without a capital constraint
by maximising bank is expected prot subject to the loan demand function, the
budget constraint and two non-negativity constraints for the interbank positions.
max
fRi;lig
E(bank)
s:t:
Li =


2 
M
Ri
 1
1 
Li + l
+
i  ei + d0 + l i
l+i  0
l i  0
The result is an optimal loan supply function
Li =
8>>>><>>>>:

MB
rI
 1
1 
if ei 

MB
rI
 1
1    d0
ei + d0 if

MAB
rI
 1
1    d0  ei 

MB
rI
 1
1    d0
MB
rI
 1
1 
if ei 

MB
rI
 1
1    d0
(4.3)
where B = 
2(2 2)
(2 )2 . The optimal loan supply to rms by banks equals the
8Note that neither the rm nor the bank gets anything in case of default on the part of
the rm. It makes the model easier to solve and doesnt change the qualitative implications.
An interpretation could be that in case of a rm default the liquidation value the bank as the
creditor can get is zero. Or else that the bank has to pay a fraction of the rms production
it can recover as auditing costs. Then assume that this fraction is one (Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist, 1998).
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optimal loan demand by rms. Thus (4.3) is the equilibrium in the market
for bank loans. The optimal bank loan supply, however, di¤ers across banks
according to the size of the liability side of their balance sheet, which is here
uniquely determined by the amount of capital a bank holds. Moreover, the
optimal bank loan supply is determined by the interbank rate, which is the
renancing cost of lending to rms for interbank borrowers and the opportunity
cost of lending to rms for interbank lenders. Given the assumption of a xed
size of debt for all banks, low capitalised banks have a lower optimal loan supply
than well capitalised ones, the di¤erence of which is due to the di¤erence in
renancing and opportunity cost of lending to rms. For low capitalised banks
the interbank rate rI is the renancing cost, whereas for well capitalised banks
the interbank rate rI times the discount factor  is the opportunity cost. The
rst line shows the optimal loan supply by interbank borrowers. Banks whose
optimal loan supply exceeds available funds borrow in the interbank market.
Their holdings of equity are too low to cover the desired amount of lending
to rms at their renancing cost rI . The second line shows the optimal loan
supply by all banks whose available funds exceed desired loan supply at the
renancing cost of rI yet fall short of the desired lending at the opportunity
cost rI . These banks are considered to be inactive in the interbank market
and adjust their interest rate instead to match demand for their loans to their
available funds. Thus, the separating force into interbank borrowers and lenders
is the discount on the return in the interbank market. The third line shows the
optimal loan supply of those banks whose available funds exceed their desired
lending at their respective opportunity costs rI : Banks with available funds
exeeding their optimal loan supply lend the di¤erence in the interbank market.
For interbank borrowers and lenders, the optimal loan supply to rms de-
creases with aggregate risk, i.e. increases with the success probability  of the
customer pool, with the range M of the distribution of the individual produc-
tivity parameter and decreases with the opportunity and renancing costs in
the interbank market, rI and rI respectively. Since well capitalised banks o¤er
lower interest rates, their optimal loan supply is larger but also the volatility of
their optimal loan supply. In this unregulated system loan supply is procyclical
in the sense that it decreases with aggregate risk since loan supply for all three
groups of banks varies positively with . The question later on will be whether
the degree of procyclicality under regulation exceeds the one without regulation.
4.3.2.2 The interbank market and determinants of 
Banks lend to and borrow from a central clearing house in the interbank market
and there are no bilateral interbank exposures. Instead the central clearing house
channels funds from interbank lenders to interbank borrowers. Eichberger and
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Summer (2005) argue that this captures an anonymous competitive interbank
market. A central clearing mechanism allows to abstract from a risk-adjusted
bilateral interbank rate and is consistent with a perfectly competitive interbank
market, where the interbank rate is determined by aggregate supply of and
demand for interbank loans. The interbank rate is determined in a competitive
equilibrium in the interbank market, where demand for interbank funds equals
their supply. Z
i
l i =
Z
i
l+i
Interbank borrowers pay the competitively determined interbank rate rI and
interbank lenders receive rI in expected terms. In the model by Eichberger
and Summer (2005)  can be derived by assuming each interbank lender gets
an equal share of available repayments by interbank borrowers if repayments
fall short of claims due to the default of some banks. In this model, however,
s = f0; 1g for all banks. The expected discount on interbank loans  equals
the probability of success of a banks portfolio, which in turn is equal to the
probability of success in production in each sector.
E() =  = E(si) = 
As such interbank loans appear as risky as loans to rms from the point of view
of an individual bank. However, in practice loans to other banks are deemed
safer than loans to rms due to an explicit or implicit government guarantee
for interbank loans, which is due to the role the interbank market plays for
nancial stability and the associated incentives for the government not to let
a large number of banks fail. In this model these considerations are not de-
rived endogenously, rather it is assumed that interbank loans are less risky than
loans to rms. However, this assumption is not crucial in this context since
the existence of a functioning interbank market requires that not all banks be
constrained at once. From this follows that only the interbank borrower banks
can be constrained because they are the ones with little equity in the model.
These banks only have interbank liabilities on their balance sheet, which are
not assigned any risk-weights. Therefore, in the model, it is not crucial what
risk-weights interbank assets carry.
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4.3.2.3 Aggregate loan supply without regulation
Summing over all banks in (4.3) yields aggregate loan supply by all banks with-
out regulation LU .
LU = aF (a  d0) +
b d0Z
a d0
(ei + d0) f (ei) dei + b [1  F (b  d0)] (4.4)
where
a =

MB
rI
 1
1 
b =

MB
rI
 1
1 
where a is the optimal loan supply to rms by banks which are interbank bor-
rowers, F (a  d0) is the proportion of interbank borrowers, b is the optimal loan
supply to rms by banks which lend in the interbank market and 1 F (b  d0) is
their proportion. The proportion of banks that are interbank borrowers, lenders
or not active in the interbank market is entirely determined by banksholdings
of capital because debt is assumed to be the same for all banks. As stated in
the beginning, these are simplifying assumptions to be able to exclusively focus
on the role of variable risk-weights for the cyclical behaviour of aggregate loan
supply. Figure 4.1 illustrates aggregate loan supply to rms across banks with
di¤erent capital holdings. In the upper part, banks with capital below a   d0
are interbank borrowers because their available funds ei+d0 fall short of desired
lending a at the renancing cost rI . Interbank borrowing for each of these banks
is the di¤ence between a and ei+ d0, depicted by the triangular l i . Banks with
capital above b   d0 are interbank lenders because their available funds exceed
desired lending b at the opportunity cost rI . Interbank loans for each of these
banks are the di¤erence between ei + d0 and b, depicted by the triangular l+i .
Banks with capital above a d0 but below b d0 are not active in the interbank
market and lend the sum of their capital and debt, ei+d0, to rms. In the lower
part a hypothetical cumulative distribution function of bank capital is graphed,
from which the proportions of each type of bank can be read o¤.
4.3.3 Optimal loan supply under regulation
4.3.3.1 Loan supply by constrained banks
We now impose a capital constraint on the banking system. Regulation requires
banks to hold at least a fraction c of risk weighted assets wLi as capital ei.
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Figure 4.1: Aggregate loan supply to rms across banks without a bank capital
constraint
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Risk-weights w depend on aggregate risk with
w = w ()
w0 =
@w()
@
< 0
Risk-weights depend only on aggregate risk, more specically the probability
that production in each sector of the economy is positive. In practice, the
risk-weights also depend on borrower specic characteristics. We abstract from
these, however, to focus on the presumption that as the economy experiences
a downswing or recession all types of borrowers appear riskier than before and
receive a higher risk-weight. Moreover, the idiosyncratic risk is diversiable
by banks. Under the Basel I Accord risk-weights were constant, whereas the
innovation in the revised framework, Basel II, is to make risk-weights dependent
on borrower riskiness, part of which is aggregate risk. Precisely this innovation
sparked the debate about potential procyclical aggregate credit supply. The
capital constraint can be written as
ei  cw ()Li
where c is some value xed by the regulator. From bank prot maximisation
one can show that the capital constraint is binding if
ei < ~h (4.5)
~h  cw ()

MB
~rI
 1
1 
= cw () ~a
Variables with a tilde denote variables in the scenario with a capital constraint.
The introduction of a capital constraint changes the equilibrium interbank rate
and therefore the opportunity cost of lending to rms. Condition (4.5) says that
banks with capital below ~h are constrained from lending as much as they would
like to. In addition the budget constraint is binding too. Also it is necessary to
assume that there are some interbank borrowers left who are willing to absorb
funds in the interbank market. Therefore we look at the case where the criti-
cal value ~h does not exceed the threshold at which a bank ceases to borrow in
the interbank market. As a consequence, in the model, only interbank borrow-
ers are potentially constrained and interbank lenders are always unconstrained.
Optimal loan supply by constrained banks Lci is then given by
Lci =
ei
cw()
if ei < ~h (4.6)
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Loan supply is determined by the capital constraint and is equal to a multiple
1
cw()
of capital. Furthermore, the cyclical properties depend on the sensitivity of
risk-weights w with respect to aggregate risk. As  rises risk-weights fall and loan
supply rises. The more risk-weights react to changes in  the stronger is the e¤ect
on loan supply by constrained banks. Unconstrained banks under regulation
behave essentially as in the unregulated case, except that under regulation they
might face a di¤erent interbank rate.
4.3.3.2 Aggregate loan supply under regulation
Summing over all constrained banks as well as the remaining unconstrained
banks yields the aggregate loan supply under regulation LR.
LR =
1
cw ()
~hZ
0
eif (ei) dei + ~a
h
F (~a  d0)  F

~h
i
+
~b d0Z
~a d0
(ei + d0) f (ei) dei +~b
h
1  F

~b  d0
i
The rst term is loan supply to rms by constrained banks with capital below ~h,
the second term is loan supply to rms by the remaining unconstrained interbank
borrowers. The third and fourth term are lending by banks not active in the
interbank market and by interbank lenders. Figure 4.2 illustrates the situation
after the introduction of bank capital regulation.The fairly steep upward sloping
line is loan supply to rms by constrained banks9. Banks with capital below or
equal to ~h supply loans according to a multiple 1
cw()
of their capital. Among
these banks some of them are interbank lenders because their (constrained)
lending to rms is lower than their available funds ei + d0. Conversely, some
constrained banks are interbank borrowers because their (constrained) lending
exceeds available funds ei + d0. Finally, by assumption a part of interbank
borrowers remain unconstrained. These banks have capital above ~h but below
~a. Note that the introduction of bank capital regulation changes the proportion
of interbank borrowers and lenders. Therefore the equilibrium interbank rate
is changed under a capital constraint. Comparing gures 4.1 and 4.2 one can
notice that desired interbank borrowing is smaller under regulation than without
regulation, given the same distribution function for bank capital10. Therefore the
interbank rate should be lower with a capital constraint, ~rI < rI . Intuitively the
9Its slope is larger than 1 for reasonable values for c and w (). Under the Basel Accord
c = 0:08 such that for risk weights up to 12:5 the slope is larger than one.
10For now the distribution of bank capital is held xed. In a later section the e¤ects of a
changing distribution of bank capital will be discussed.
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Figure 4.2: Aggregate loan supply to rms with a bank capital constraint
reason is that some banks that originally borrowed from the interbank market
are forced by the capital constraint to borrow less or even lend funds in the
interbank market. As a result lending to rms by interbank borrowers and
lenders is larger under regulation, ~a > a and ~b > b.
4.4 Assessing procyclicality
4.4.1 Fluctuations of aggregate lending without a capital
constraint
To derive a benchmark for cyclicality of aggregate lending to which we can
compare the cyclicality under bank capital regulation consider an increase in
the probability of success , i.e. a decrease in aggregate risk, in the situation
without a capital requirement. One could interpret this as an upswing or boom
in the economy. From (4.4) it is clear that interbank borrowers want to increase
their loan supply if  rises because expected prots of banks increase with a
higher probability of success in each sector. Note however, that interbank lenders
dont increase lending. The reason is that at the same time as the probability
of success of rms rises so does the expected repayment from lending in the
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interbank market, since  = , such that the opportunity cost of lending to
rms increases to the same extent as the expected prot from lending to rms
increases. This means that demand for interbank loans rises while supply stays
the same such that the interbank rate rises.
drI
d
> 0
The appendix provides an exact solution for the response of the interbank rate
to a rise in . Therefore in deriving an analytical expression for the response
of aggregate loan supply we need to take the reaction of the interbank rate to
a change in aggregate risk into account. The rst derivative with respect to
aggregate risk  yields
@LU
@
= a0F (a  d0) + b0 [1  F (b  d0)] (4.7)
where F (ei) is the cumulative distribution function of bank capital, r0I =
drI
d
is
the change in the interbank rate after a change in , and
a0 =
1
1  
MB (rI   r0I)
r2I

MB
rI
 
1 
(4.8)
b0 =   1
1  
MBr0I
r2I

MB
rI
 
1 
(4.9)
The change in aggregate lending in response to a change in aggregate risk is
the sum of the marginal response of lending by interbank borrowers times their
proportion and the marginal change in lending by interbank lenders times their
proportion. The marginal response of loan supply to rms by interbank bor-
rowers is positive, since 0 < drI
d
< rI

11. In contrast the marginal response of
interbank lenders is negative. Intuitively this is because for interbank lenders
the induced credit expansion to rms due to an increase in the probability of
success  is o¤set by a corresponding increase in the expected return from inter-
bank lending due to the same increase in , which a¤ects interbank lender banks
via their counterparts in the interbank market. In addition, desired lending to
rms and therefore desired borrowing from the interbank market increases for
interbank borrowers, which tends to increase the interbank rate. As a result
loans to rms by interbank lenders tend to decrease (b0 < 0) and loans to rms
by interbank borrowers tend to increase (a0 > 0).
However, since bank capital and bank debt are xed for all banks there can
be no change in the aggregate volume of lending to rms. Therefore the increase
in lending to rms by interbank borrowers is exactly o¤set by the decrease in
11See appendix for proof.
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lending by interbank lenders. Merely the distribution of lending to rms across
di¤erent banks changes.
In order to allow for uctuations in aggregate lending over and above uctu-
ations in aggregate bank capital and debt, there needs to be an asset that can
be added or withdrawn from banksaggregate balance sheet. This could be any
asset like bank capital, bank debt, government bonds or interbank funds. To
focus on the role of variable risk-weights in the uctuation of aggregate credit,
bank capital needs to be held constant. In any other case, the ease with which
this additional asset could be sold or bought determines the extent to which
aggregate lending can uctuate. A central bank which is able to reduce or in-
crease the aggregate amount of interbank funds by open market interventions
is a convenient example to illustrate how aggregate uctuations in lending to
rms depend on the sensitivity of the interest rate on alternative assets. It is
convenient because it avoids the introduction of another asset, while yielding
the same insights. However, since there is no ination in the model the central
bank is really just an example. What matters is the elasticity of supply and
demand of any outside asset.
Example: A central bank Consider a central bank which intervenes in the
interbank market to inject or withdraw funds with the aim of minimising a typi-
cal loss function. The loss function is increasing in the deviation of ination and
output from target. Moreover, the central bank places a certain weight on the
output gap versus the deviation of ination from target. Output and ination
both fall with the interest rate, which is in the model equal to the interbank
rate. Consider a cost-push shock which pushes up output and decreases ina-
tion. The weight on output vs. ination determines the strength of an interest
rate response to a cost-push shock. In the model an increase in the probability
of success  could be the result of a cost-push shock. The elasticity of demand
for or supply of interbank funds by the central bank is reected in the sen-
sitivity of the interbank rate to a change in . In the one extreme case were
the central bank only cares about ination it might intervene in the interbank
market to reduce the interbank rate by supplying additional funds. Then both
interbank borrowers and lenders increase loans to rms after the increase in .
Consequently, aggregate lending to rms increases. The other extreme case the
central bank doesnt place any weight on ination and only on the output gap
and doesnt intervene at all, is equivalent to the original situation, in which ag-
gregate lending doesnt change at all because the interbank rate adjusts to keep
aggregate lending and therefore output constant.
In sum, the cyclical behaviour of aggregate lending crucially depends in the
model on the sensitivity of the interbank rate with respect to changes in ag-
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gregate risk. More precisely the sensitivity of the interbank rate is determined
by the elasticity of supply of and demand for alternative assets to rm credits,
which in the model are interbank loans. Therefore the sensitivity of the inter-
bank rate in response to a change in  proxies for the ease with which outside
funds are added to or withdrawn from the banking system. In the following
sections uctuations of aggregate credit with and without a capital constraint
have therefore to be compared for a given degree of sensitivity of the interbank
rate to changes in .
4.4.2 Fluctuations of aggregate lending with a capital
constraint
The response of aggregate lending under regulation to a change in aggregate risk
 is given by
@LR
@
= ~a0
h
F (~a  d0)  F

~h
i
+~b0
h
1  F

~b  d0
i
(4.10)
  w
0
cw ()
~hZ
0
eif (ei) dei
where again F (ei) is the cumulative distribution function of bank capital, ~a0 =
a0 (~rI) and ~b0 = b0 (~rI) are the marginal responses of interbank borrowers and
lenders, evaluated at the lower interbank rate under regulation ~rI , and ~a > a
and ~b > b are loan supply to rms by interbank borrowers and lenders, respec-
tively12. The response of aggregate lending is composed of the marginal response
of unconstrained interbank borrowers times their proportion, the marginal re-
sponse of interbank lenders times their proportion and the marginal response
of constrained banks times their proportion. Note that the marginal response
of constrained banks depends on the sensitivity of risk-weights with respect to
aggregate risk. For c  ! 0 the expression collapses into the one for the unreg-
ulated system.
4.4.3 A measure of procyclicality
To analyse the e¤ect of a capital constraint on the cyclical behaviour of aggregate
bank lending we look at the di¤erence  in the marginal change in lending to
12Since the marginal response of the interbank rate to a change in  is taken to be given
and the same under both regimes it is denoted by r0I throughout.
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rms after a change in  with and without the capital constraint.
 =
@LR
@
  @L
U
@
In the following we wish to analyse the determinants of . We are thus in-
terested in the degree of excess procyclicality and whether  could potentially
become negative. There are three scenarios that we would like to compare: no
capital constraint, a capital constraint with constant risk-weights (Basel I) and
a capital constraint with variable risk-weights (Basel II). Denote the di¤erence
in uctuation without the constraint and a constraint with constant risk-weights
by I , and the di¤erence in uctuation without the constraint and a constraint
with variable risk-weights by II .
4.4.4 Constant risk-weights
A situation with constant risk-weights corresponds to the regulatory framework
of Basel I. Since we only look at the case where bank capital is xed I is
I =   ~a0F

~h

(4.11)
+ ~a0F (~a  d0) + ~b0
h
1  F

~b  d0
i
  a0F (a  d0)  b0 [1  F (b  d0)]
where a0, b0, ~a0, ~b0 and ~h are dened as above. The rst line is the avoided uctua-
tion of lending to rms by constrained banks, whose lending doesnt vary with .
Fluctuations in lending by constrained banks can only be driven by uctuations
in their bank capital, which is ruled out in the model. The second line is the sum
of the marginal responses of lending by interbank borrowers and lenders under
a minimum capital requirement times their proportion respectively. The third
line is the same measure without any capital constraint. The di¤erence between
the second and third line is that the interbank rate is lower under regulation,
which has an impact on the proportions of interbank borrowers and lenders and
on their marginal responses to .
The degree of procyclicality depends on the change in proportions of inter-
bank borrowers and lenders due to the lower interbank rate after introduction of
a capital requirement, and their respective sensitivities of lending to a change in
. The reason is that the introduction of capital regulation changes the equilib-
rium interbank rate and therefore the marginal responses of lending to rms to
a change in . Moreover the marginal responses of lending to rms also depend
on the elasticity of the interbank rate with respect to  as can be seen from
(4.8) and (4.9). Then the degree of excess procyclicality depends on whether
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the response of lending of unconstrained banks under a regulated regime is more
or less sensitive to  than their response in an unregulated regime. Moreover,
since desired unconstrained lending also changes with regulation because the
opportunity cost rI changes, the proportion of interbank borrowers and lenders
changes under regulation too.
More specically, since ~rI < rI the proportion of unconstrained interbank
borrowers, F (~a  d0), is higher under regulation because the lower interbank
rate makes it protable for more banks to lend to rms. These additional banks
will now act as borrowers in the interbank market, whereas before they belonged
to the group of banks inactive in the interbank market. Similarly, the proportion
of interbank lenders, 1  F

~b  d0

, will fall because some of them now nd it
less protable to lend in the interbank market at the lower interest rate ~rI .
The size of the marginal responses of lending to rms by these two types of
banks with and without a capital requirement, depends crucially on the sensi-
tivity of the interbank rate to a change in aggregate risk  as can be seen from
(4.8) and (4.9). In particular the marginal response of interbank lenders under
regulation, ~b0, is always larger in absolute terms than without regulation, b0, for
a given value of r0I . Thus, there are two countervailing e¤ects with regard to
interbank lenders: On the one hand, they tend to reduce their lending because ~rI
rises after an increase in . On the other hand their proportion in the economy
falls as the threshold rises above which a bank is an interbank lender.
Whether the marginal response of lending to rms by interbank borrowers
is larger or smaller under regulation depends on the sensitivity of the interbank
rate to a change in risk, r0I . For values of r
0
I < k
~rI

, where k < 1, ~a0 > a0,
i.e. as long as the sensitivity of the interbank rate with respect to aggregate
risk is not too large, the marginal response of lending to rms by unconstrained
interbank borrower banks is larger under regulation than without regulation13.
The reason is that in response to a decrease in aggregate risk ( rises) banks
want to increase their lending. However, at the same time the increase in 
also increases the interbank rate rI because more banks want to borrow in the
interbank market and fewer want to lend there. The introduction of a capital
requirement increases the rst e¤ect of the two because the marginal response of
lending to a change in  is larger with a lower interbank rate ~rI , while the second
one is taken as determined exogenously (e.g. by a central bank). Therefore there
exists a value for r0I below which the marginal response of lending to rms by
interbank borrowers to a change in  is larger under regulation than without.
In sum there are a number of countervailing e¤ects that jointly determine
the extent of (excess) procyclicality under a regime of bank capital regulation à
la Basel I, i.e. with xed risk-weights.
13See appendix for a derivation of k.
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4.4.5 Variable risk-weights
The situation with variable risk-weights corresponds to the revised Basel frame-
work, Basel II, and is the source of concern over excessively procyclical behav-
iour of aggregate bank lending. To evaluate this concern look at the di¤erence in
credit uctuation without a capital constraint and one with variable risk-weights
II .
II =  ~a0F

~h

  w
0
cw ()
~hZ
0
eif (ei) dei
+~a0F (~a  d0) + ~b0
h
1  F

~b  d0
i
 a0F (a  d0)  b0 [1  F (b  d0)]
Use Iand II to nd the additional uctuation in credit induced by the intro-
duction of variable risk-weights into existing bank capital regulation.
II  I =   w
0
cw ()
~hZ
0
eif (ei) dei > 0 (4.12)
This shows that there is indeed reason for concern about variable risk-weights
increasing the uctuation of aggregate credit. There are three qualications
to make, though. The rst is that the extent of excess procyclicality clearly
depends on the sensitivity of risk-weights with respect to changes in w0 (). The
smaller it is, the less excess procyclicality will occur. Second, the degree of excess
procyclicality also depends on the share of constrained banks, holding capital of
less than ~h. The smaller this share the smaller excess procylicality. Third, from
(4.11) the question arises whether aggregate credit is unambiguously excessively
procyclical under a capital constraint with constant risk-weights compared to
the unregulated system. This brings up the question whether the introduction
of bank capital regulation has the potential to even reduce the uctuations of
aggregate credit supply.
4.4.6 Can bank capital regulation reduce credit uctua-
tions?
To answer that question look at (4.11) again and note that I < 0 if
~a0
h
F (~a  d0)  F

~h
i
+~b0
h
1  F

~b  d0
i
< a0F (a  d0)+b0 [1  F (b  d0)]
Suppose, rst, that the equilibrium interbank rate rI doesnt change upon
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introduction of a capital requirement. In the example with a central bank this
could be the case when the central bank absorbes the additional supply of in-
terbank funds by those banks that are now constrained, accommodating the
resulting drop in aggregate bank lending. Then, I < 0 if
 ~a0F

~h

< 0
a condition which is fullled if r0I <
rI

. Again there are two e¤ects from a rise
in  on the marginal response of lending ~a0: The rst comes from the fact that
a higher  makes lending to rms more attractive and tends to increase loan
supply to rms. The second works via increasing the interbank rate and thereby
o¤setting the tendency to expand loan supply. As long as the second e¤ect is
not too large, loan supply by interbank borrower banks increases. Thus, these
banks would expand lending to rms but are constrained from doing so because
their capital is below ~h. Instead their lending is determined by (4.6), which
doesnt vary with . Therefore the degree of a change in aggregate lending in
response to a change in  is reduced.
Second, suppose that the interbank rate decreases from rI to ~rI upon intro-
duction of the capital constraint as before. Then, I < 0 if, rst, k ~rI

< r0I <
~rI

and, second, the proportions of unconstrained interbank borrowers and lenders
dont change very much after imposing the capital requirement. From condition
one follows that the marginal responses of lending to rms by interbank lenders
are negative, with the response under regulation being larger in absolute terms
than without regulation, ~b0 < b0 < 0. Moreover, the marginal response of lending
to rms by interbank borrowers under regulation is positive but smaller than
without regulation, ~a0 < a0. If additionally, the proportions of unconstrained in-
terbank borrowers and lenders with and without the capital requirement dont
change very much, it is possible that the degree of procyclicality is even reduced
under a capital requirement. Whether condition two is met depends essentially
on the shape of the distribution function of bank capital, for a given di¤erence
between rI and ~rI14. These are examples that excessively procyclical aggregate
credit is not a necessary consequence of bank capital regulation in this model.
4.5 Discussion
The distribution of bank capital The introduction of a bank capital con-
straint is aimed at ensuring adequate capitalisation of banks in order to increase
nancial stability. Initially constrained banks might aim at restoring their bank
capital to attain the optimal level of lending to rms in the absence of the capital
14The appendix provides a detailed illustration of this point.
95
The cyclicality of aggregate bank lending
restriction. Therefore it might be expected that the distribution of bank capital
changes with the introduction of a stringent capital requirement. In the model
that means that the proportion of banks that hold equity below the required
minimum decreases. In (4.12) that would lead to a decrease in excess procycli-
cality when switching from Basel I to Basel II, since the proportion of banks
holding less capital than ~h decreases.
With regard to the cyclicality of bank lending under a Basel I regime with
constant risk-weights, the proportion of banks with capital less than ~h also
decreases. At the same time, however, the equilibrium interbank rate will be
a¤ected since the ratio of interbank borrowers and lenders might change. To
the extent that banks will raise their capital to a level not much above the
required one, the proportion of interbank borrowers increases again, which tends
to increase the interbank rate again.
Cyclical bank capital holdings It is plausible to allow bank capital to vary
over the business cycle too. In a downswing as more rms default on their
loans banks write them o¤ their equity holdings. Conversely in an upswing
bank prots increase and might add to their capital holdings. In the present
analysis we have abstracted from this aspect to fully concentrate on the e¤ect
of the introduction of variable risk-weights. However, to briey comment on
the impact of cyclical bank capital holdings, note that they would introduce
some cyclicality of the aggregate banking balance sheet over and above the one
induced by adding or withdrawing interbank funds. Therefore the interbank
rate neednt adjust as much in response to a change in aggregate risk. However,
even with cyclical capital holdings the need for an additional asset that can
be added or withdrawn from the aggregate banking balance sheet remains to
yield an e¤ect on the uctuation of aggregate bank lending over and above the
uctuation in aggregate bank capital holdings.
4.6 Conclusion
Starting from the observation that most banks hold more capital than the re-
quired minimum and moreover to varying extents we have set up a model of a
banking system in which we can analyse the e¤ect of a change in aggregate risk,
like in an upswing or in a downswing, on aggregate credit supply to rms. We
nd that the extent to which aggregate bank credit uctuates with or without
a capital constraint depends crucially on the ease with which additional assets
like funds from the interbank market can be added to or withdrawn from the
aggregate balance sheet of the banking sector, which is reected in the sensitiv-
ity of the interbank rate with respect to a change in aggregate risk. In addition,
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the introduction of a bank capital constraint changes the equilibrium interbank
rate, the marginal responses of bank lending to a change in risk and the propor-
tions of interbank borrowers and lenders. Therefore the e¤ect of introducing a
bank capital constraint with constant or with variable risk-weights a¤ects not
only the behaviour of constrained but also the one of the unconstrained banks.
Consequently, the cyclicality of aggregate credit is a function of the sensitivity
of risk-weights with respect to changes in risk, the responses of lending by con-
strained and by unconstrained banks in the system, their respective shares in
the banking sector and the sensitivity of the interbank rate with regard to a
change in aggregate risk.
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Appendix 4.A Derivation of rmsloan demand
The rm in sector i maximises
E(firm) = 
MZ
q
(qLi  RiLi)g(q)dq
= 

1
2
MLi  RiLi +
R2iL
2 
i
2M

taking Ri as given and q = RiL1 i : This yields the rst order condition

2
M  RiL1 i + (2  )
R2i
2M
L2 2i = 0
which is quadratic in Li with two solutions
L1i =


2  
M
Ri
 1
1 
and
L2i =

M
Ri
 1
1 
We choose the rst solution because under the second one the threshold q for
a positive expected payo¤ would be at the maximum M and loan demand by
rms would be zero.
Appendix 4.B Optimal loan supply without reg-
ulation
Bank is problem is
max
fRi;lig
E(bank)
s:t:
Li =


2 
M
Ri
 1
1 
Li + l
+
i  ei + d0 + l i
l+i  0
l i  0
which results in the Lagrangean
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L = 
2  2
2  


2  
M
Ri
 1
1 
Ri   rEei   rI l i + rI l+i
+(ei + d0 + l
 
i  


2  
M
Ri
 1
1 
  l+i ) +  l+i + l i
with the Langrangean multipliers ,  , .
The rst order conditions are:

2  2
2     R
 1
i = 0 (4.13)
rI   +  = 0 (4.14)
 rI + +  = 0 (4.15)
(ei + d0 + l
 
i  


2  
M
Ri
 1
1 
  l+i ) = 0 (4.16)
 l+i = 0 (4.17)
l i = 0 (4.18)
From (4.14)  > 0. Thus, three cases remain to be looked at. Also note that
from (4.14) and (4.15) that  +  > 0, i.e. a bank will never lend and borrow in
the interbank market at the same time.
Case 1:  = 0 and  > 0
l+i = 0 and l
 
i =


2 
M
Ri
 1
1    ei   d0  0. The bank will borrow from the
interbank market. By (4.14) and (4.15) rI = , and by (4.13)
Ri =
rI(2  )
(2  2)
Li =

MB
rI
 1
1 
where B = 
2(2 2)
(2 )2 : This case applies if
ei 

MB
rI
 1
1 
  d0
Case 2:  > 0 and  > 0
l+i = l
 
i = 0. The bank will neither lend nor borrow from the interbank
market. From (4.14) and (4.15) rI <  < rI . From the budget constraint we
get
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Ri =
M
(2  ) (ei + d0)1 
Li = ei + d0
And this case applies for

MB
rI
 1
1 
  d0 < ei <

MB
rI
 1
1 
  d0
Case 3:  > 0 and  = 0
l  = 0 and l+ = ei+d0 

M
Ri
 1
1   0. The bank is an interbank lender. The
optimal interest rate is
Ri =
rI (2  )
 (2  2)
and the optimal loan size is
Li =

MB
rI
 1
1 
This case applies for
ei >

MB
rI
 1
1 
  d0
Appendix 4.C Optimal loan supply under reg-
ulation
The banks problem is the same as without regulation only subject to an addi-
tional constraint.
max
fRi;lig
E(bank)
s:t:
Li =


2 
M
Ri
 1
1 
Li + l
+
i  ei + d0 + l i
l+i  0
l i  0
ei  cw ()Li
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The resulting Lagrangean is given by
L = 
2  2
2   Ri


2  
M
Ri
 1
1 
  rEei   ~rI l i + rI l+i
+(ei + d0 + l
 
i  


2  
M
Ri
 1
1 
  l+i ) +  l+i + l i
+
 
ei   cw


2  
M
Ri
 1
1 
!
The rst order conditions are

2  2
2     (+ cw)R
 1
i = 0 (4.19)
~rI   +  = 0 (4.20)
 ~rI + +  = 0 (4.21)
(ei + d0 + l
 
i  


2  
M
Ri
 1
1 
  l+i ) = 0 (4.22)
 l+i = 0 (4.23)
l i = 0 (4.24)

 
ei   cw


2  
M
Ri
 1
1 
!
= 0 (4.25)
 > 0 for the same reasons as above. With  = 0 the capital constraint is
not binding and the case without regulation applies. The capital constraint is
binding if  > 0; and by (4.19) and (4.25) this applies if
ei < cw

MB

 1
1 
Again there are three cases to distinguish:  > 0 and  = 0,  = 0 and  > 0,
 = 0 and  = 0 with the same implications as above. Note that in order to
have a functioning interbank market 0 < rI < 1. Otherwise there is either
excess demand or supply and no equilibrium. Thus not all interbank borrowers
must be constrained at once, which imposes the restriction:
cw

MB
~rI
 1
1 
<

MB
~rI
 1
1 
  d0
or
d0
1  cw <

MB
~rI
 1
1 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Appendix 4.D The response of the equilibrium
interbank rate to a change in ag-
gregate risk
One can derive an expression for the response of rI to a change in , @rI@ by
taking the total derivative of the interbank equilibrium condition with respect
to rI and . Z
i
l i =
Z
i
l+i
a d0Z
0
[a  (ei + d0)] f (ei) dei =
emaxZ
b d0
[ei + d0   b] f (ei) dei
where emax is bank capital of the bank with the highest bank capital holdings.
Implicit di¤erentiation yields
F (a  d0) @a
@rI
+
@b
@rI
  F (b  d0) @b
@rI

drI =  F (a  d0) @a
@
d
which results in
drI
d
=
rI

 
1 +
@b
@rI
[1  F (b  d0)]
@a
@rI
F (a  d0)
! 1
Together with
@a
@rI
< 0
@b
@rI
< 0
it follows
0 <
drI
d
<
rI

Appendix 4.E The size of the marginal responses
of lending to rms with and with-
out regulation
Consider the marginal response of lending to rms by interbank lenders as given
by
b0 =   1
1  
MBr0I
r2I

MB
rI
 
1 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and
~b0 =   1
1  
MBr0I
~r2I

MB
~rI
 
1 
respectively. Since ~rI < rI under regulation and for a given value of r0I it follows
that ~b0 > jb0j
The marginal response of lending to rms by interbank borrowers without reg-
ulation as given by
a0 =
1
1  
MB (rI   r0I)
r2I

MB
rI
 
1 
is smaller than the corresponding measure under regulation
~a0 =
1
1  
MB (~rI   r0I)
~r2I

MB
~rI
 
1 
i.e. ~a0 > a0, if
@rI
@
<
1 

~rI
rI
 1
1 
1 

~rI
rI
 2 
1 
~rI

 k ~rI

Appendix 4.F The role of the distribution func-
tion of bank capital
In section 4.4 it was shown that the degree of excess procyclicality depends on a
number of di¤erent factors, one of which is the exact shape of the cumulative dis-
tribution function of bank capital. Figure 4.3 shows one theoretical distribution
function F (ei) with the associated thresholds separating banks into interbank
borrowers, ei < a  d0, and interbank lenders, ei > b  d0. The introduction of
a minimum capital requirement reduces the equilibrium interbank rate rI to ~rI .
This leads to an increase in both thresholds to ~a d0 and ~b d0. The associated
change in the proportions of interbank borrowers and lenders depend on the
exact shape of the distribution function. Figure 4.3 illustrates the case where
the change in these proportions is small. For other shapes of the distribution
function it might be much larger.
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Figure 4.3: Theoretical cumulative distribution function of bank capital
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